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Abstract
Imagery has long been utilized in clinical treatments of affective symptoms with the
assumption that mental imagery can stand in for its perceptual counterpart and exert regulatory
effects over emotional responses. While this assumption has its ground in theoretical framework
of mental imagery supported by evidence of neurological overlaps between imagery and
perception, and clinical applications of imagery interventions were found to be successful, very
little has been done through means of experimental examinations.
This investigation began with a differential fear conditioning study (study 1) to simulate
and assess imagery extinction. Results provided support for the efficacy of imagery exposure in
that no spontaneous recovery was observed upon re-exposure based on skin conductance
response/SCR. Study 2 sought to replicate the findings of study 1 with the adjustments of
conditioning parameters to strengthen the conditioning effect, and the addition of neuroimaging
data collection. Successful replication was achieved.
Efforts of engaging a range of measurement types were explicitly made in consideration
of the multi-component view emotion. An area for future research in to include simultaneous
behavioral indices of fear. To pave the ground, a third study (study 3) was conducted to inspect
such possibility through a basic visual attention task. It was found that this specific task was
sensitive to differential conditioning and did not lead to interference with conditioning as
measured by self-reported fear and SCR supporting its use in similar conditioning designs.
Keywords: differential fear conditioning, extinction, mental imagery, SCR, self-reported fear,
fMRI, anterior insular, dorsal anterior cingulate
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Affective Mental Imagery and Its Theories
If you are like me, who is terrified of public speaking, then you might have received the
recommendation, perhaps several times, to take on as many opportunities as you can to put
yourself in front of a crowd and practice boldness. This could be difficult for some to manage,
however, in that these opportunities can be hard to find and perhaps more importantly, the fear
that comes with forcing oneself to take on this challenge may deter one from trying altogether.
Indeed, in vivo exposure treatments’ dropout rates are not low (Gould, Buckminster, Pollack,
Otto, & Yap, 1997; Gould, Ott, & Pollack, 1995). Taking a step back, the next best option is
perhaps imagining oneself being under a group’s scrutiny to provide a more readily available and
less intimidating opportunity to teach yourself the art of public speaking. Indeed, for tens of
thousands years, humans have long attempted manipulations of emotions via means of mental
imagery such as the ancient practice of shamanism (Achterberg, 2002) and the more modern
imagery-based techniques of cognitive behavioral therapy such as imaginal exposure which
involves repeated exposures to imagined feared stimuli/scenarios (Bryant, Moulds, Guthrie,
Dang, & Nixon, 2003; Kandris & Moulds, 2008), and imagery rescripting through which
imagined changes are made to aversive experiences (Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007). These
imagery-based interventions are widely adopted with the assumption that mental imagery can
substitute for the actual stimuli in affective processes to induce and regulate fear responses.
In the discussion of mental imagery, two major factions of theorists have held extensive
and heated debates over what mental imagery is. One party regards imagery as a propositional
construct while the other argues that imagery is pictorial in nature. An example from the first
group and one of the earliest imagery theories is Lang’s bio-information theory (Lang, 1979).
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According to Lang’s descriptions, emotional imagery is a propositional network consisting of
information about the label of imagined stimulus (e.g., a snake), stimulus related semantics (e.g.,
snakes are dangerous), modality specific perceptual responses (e.g., seeing a snake), and motor
programs for efferent output (e.g., heart racing). It was through the activation of this
propositional network during imagery that modifications were made to emotional responses to
the actual stimuli (Lang, 1977, 1979). Divergent from this propositional construction of mental
imagery is the pictorial/depictive theory of mental imagery, which conceptualizes mental
imagery as a quasi-pictorial image formed in the “visual buffer” based on information about the
imagined object or scene stored in long-term memory (Kosslyn, 1981). According to this second
school of imagery theories, mental imagery behaves like weaker versions of perceptual
representations and thus can “stand in” for corresponding external stimuli in affective processes
(Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015). This debate over whether mental imagery is
propositional or depictive has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (Kosslyn, Thompson, &
Ganis, 2006; Pylyshyn, 2003) and will not be considered here. Regardless which side one is on,
researchers agree that mental imagery has the capacity to elicit emotional responses similar to its
perceptual counterparts.
In a review by Holmes and Mathews (2010), the authors proposed three pathways
through which mental imagery can exert influences on emotional responses. The first pathway is
through mental imagery’s direct contacts with emotional systems in the brain. This is consistent
with Lang’s bio-informational theory (Lang, 1977, 1979) in that mental imagery is hypothesized
to have the capacity to directly act upon cognitive processes and brain regions involved in
emotion perception and regulation. The second pathway is built upon its affinity to perception
supported by the overlap in neurological activations between imagery and perception (Kreiman,
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Koch, & Fried, 2000; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; A. Schaefer et al., 2003). Based
on this conceptualization, mental imagery behaves similarly to perception and thus elicits similar
neural activities as external emotion eliciting stimuli. The third pathway was made possible by
imagery’s potential capacity to interact with past emotional memories and reactivate related
affective states. This connection/overlap between imagery and autobiographical memory is
supported by neuroimaging evidence that imagining the future and remembering the past may
share a common brain system (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Holmes and Mathews (2010)
proposed that as imagery generation draws upon autobiographical memory, if the accessed
memory contains affect-related information, the constructed imagery could share the same
emotion. It is worth noting that these three proposed pathways of emotion regulation through
imagery are not mutually exclusive and they may all be constituting parts of the complete
operations of affective mental imagery.
1.2. Clinical Implications of Affective Mental Imagery
Consistent with the theorizing of imagery’s capacity to possess emotional characteristics,
great emphasis has been made over the role of imagery in both symptom presentations and
clinical treatments of various affective conditions. Evidence has shown that mental images often
evoke stronger emotional consequences compared to verbal presentations (Holmes & Mathews,
2005; Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008), especially in those with affective
conditions such as anxiety and depression (Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, Schmid, & Holmes,
2011). Frequent and intrusive imagery is also prominent in various emotional disturbances, such
excessive negative images of oneself in social situations in social phobia (Hackmann, Clark, &
McManus, 2000), unintentional re-experiencing of traumatic events in post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD; Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004), intrusive imagery of both the past and the
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future in bipolar disorder (Gregory, Brewin, Mansell, & Donaldson, 2010), and intrusive
prospective imagery in anxiety and major depressive disorder (MDD; Morina et al., 2011). In a
review by Brewin et al. (2010), prevalence of recurrent negative intrusive images in different
psychological disorders was found to be as high as 100% in certain patient populations. While
healthy controls also reported occasional intrusive imagery, they are less distressing compared to
patient groups (Brewin et al., 2010). More relevant to the current investigation, however, is that
the great majority of the studies reviewed described these intrusive imageries as vivid and
accompanied by intense physical and emotional reactions.
Abnormalities in imagery functioning has also been proposed to be an important
component of the underlying causes of the affective complaints experienced by those with the
above psychological disturbances. Some of these discussions were structured around the third
pathway of connections between imagery and emotion proposed by Mathews (2010), specifically
on the simulation of dreaded future outcomes/prospective imagery drawn from autobiographical
memories of the past. Morina et al. (2011) compared patients with anxiety, MDD, and healthy
controls, and found that the patient groups in contrast to the control group, experienced
impoverished positive prospective imagery, and that the anxiety group in particular reported
greater ability to generate vivid negative prospective imagery. Taken together, this deficiency of
positive imagery and exaggerated negative imagery of the future, accompanied by a heightened
emotional reactivity towards imagery (Morina et al., 2011), further aided by the amplifying
effects of imagery on emotional responses (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2008) is
likely to play an important part in the manifestation and maintenance of affective symptoms in
clinical populations.
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While this proposed course of imagery dysfunctions to the etiology of affective
conditions is only at the hypothesizing stage, and there lacks an integrative account of imagery’s
role in the maintenance of the above affective conditions, imagery has been readily involved in
various clinical treatments and its efficacy is not without verifications. Two of the most popular
strategies, as mentioned previously, are imaginal exposure (Bryant et al., 2003; Kandris &
Moulds, 2008) and imagery rescripting (Holmes et al., 2007). Ample evidence has been found in
support of the effectiveness of imaginal exposure in treatments of PTSD (for review see Powers,
Halpern, Ferenschak, Gillihan, & Foa, 2010) and other anxiety disorders such as phobias
(Hecker, 1990; Turner, Beidel, & Jacob, 1994) and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD;
Abramowitz, 1996). Similarly, imaginal rescripting was assessed for and received confirmations
on its effectiveness in treatments of phobias, depression, PTSD, and OCD, etc. (for review see
Arntz, 2012). In imagery exposure and imagery rescripting, affective imagery was utilized as
tools to activate feared object or situation and evoke changes in their corresponding emotional
responses. In some other perhaps less frequently examined cases, imagery itself becomes the
target of treatments. Examples include disrupting the reconsolidation of negative imagery
(Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 2009; James et al., 2015) and promoting positive
imagery (T. J. Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012). Again, evidence gathered
from these examinations provided support for the effectiveness of imagery-based interventions.
1.3. Neural Overlaps Between Imagery and Perception
In addition to theoretical foundations and successful clinical applications, evidence has
also been gathered through neuroimaging research which provided support of the capacity of
mental imagery to serve as a substitute for perceptual stimuli in emotional processing.
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1.3.1. Higher Order Systems
Research has found that mental imagery shares neural overlaps with perceptual stimuli on
both emotional and unemotional stimuli. Meta-analytic reviews reported multiple brain regions
to be associated with the emotional processing of perceptual stimuli, such as medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula (INS), and amygdala (Kober et al., 2008;
Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Phan et al., 2002). And activations of the same
regions have been reported during affective mental imagery, including ventromedial prefrontal
cortext (vmPFC; A. Schaefer et al., 2003), ACC, INS (Phan et al., 2002), and amygdala
(Kreiman et al., 2000). Consistent with the idea of overlaps/parallels between mental imagery
and perception, neural imaging research has also found evidence of similar content-directed
selectiveness towards imagine and viewed objects. Such as the study by O’Craven and
Kanwisher (2000) which reported selective activations in fusiform face area, a brain region
sensitive to visually presented faces, when imagining faces but not places, and activations of
parahippocampal place area, an area sensitive to viewing images of places, when imagining
places but not faces.
1.3.2. Early Visual Areas
In addition to these frontal and temporal regions, activations of regions within the
occipital cortex such as early visual areas were also commonly shared by imagery and
perception, though with a smaller degree of overlaps in comparison to the other higher order
regions with perception leading a stronger drive for activations (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn,
2004). What is perhaps more interesting is the finding that mental imagery produced retinotopic
maps with similar organizations to the corresponding perception maps both found in early visual
areas (Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2005). These findings are of great significance because
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they offer arguments for that mental imagery is at least in part depictive. “In part” because these
activations within early visual areas have not been consistently reported across studies.
Importantly, however, these variances were not random and can be accounted for by
methodological differences (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003).
1.3.3. Brain Lesion Evidence
Another area of supporting evidence comes from brain damage research in that there
seem to be parallels between the imagery and perception disruptions experienced by patients. For
example, a patient with left occipital damage experienced difficulties naming both imagined and
visually presented colors (De Vreese, 1991). Another patient with a severe closed head injury
exhibited impaired abilities to both generate and recognize images of faces (Young, Humphreys,
Riddoch, Hellawell, & de Haans, 1994). These findings of functional and structural overlaps
between mental imagery and perception during processing of both emotional and unemotional
materials, compared to clinical evidence by itself, provide a more concrete ground for the
intuition that imagery behaves similarly to perception and can act as its substitute.
Considering the private nature of mental imagery, these advances and discoveries in
neuroimaging research provides a unique window to probe into the mechanisms of mental
imagery in relation to perception. It is important to note, however, that while the abundance of
evidence listed above confirms the close affinity between imagery and perception, it is not to say
that the two processes are the same. In fact, many researchers have illustrated that these neural
overlaps/parallels are restricted to a subset of brain regions (Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000;
Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997), and the presence and absence of their activations are
affected by methodological variances (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). In addition, in a review by
Bartolomeo (2002), the author listed numerous cases where patients display symptoms of
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dissociations between imagery and perception, specifically, some were found to experience
disrupted imagery with intact perception and others exhibited normal imagery functioning while
failing at perception tasks. In summary, neurological evidence provides support for overlaps and
similarities between mental imagery and perception, though these two actions likely still have
their respective specialized mechanisms.
1.4. Mental Imagery in Fear Conditioning and Extinction
Compared to the above theoretical discussions, assessments of clinical treatments, and
neurological examinations, experimental research of emotional imagery has received little
attention despite being the most direct way to investigate the assumed relationship between
mental imagery and emotion regulation. Among the limited experimental literature, many opted
to use associative learning paradigms such as differential fear conditioning to study emotion
(Agren, Björkstrand, & Fredrikson, 2017; Greening et al., 2021; Grégoire & Greening, 2019;
Koizumi et al., 2016; Reddan, Wager, & Schiller, 2018). In a typical differential fear
conditioning paradigm, two initially neutral conditioned stimuli (CSs) are involved. While one of
the CSs (CS+) is repeatedly paired with an aversive or threatening unconditioned stimulus (US;
e.g., a loud noise or mild electric shock), the other CS (CS-) is never accompanied by the US (R.
M. Carter, Hofstotter, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2003). Following repeated pairing, the CS+ but not the
CS- would exhibit a conditioned responses (CR) that is originally associated with the US (e.g.,
elevations in self-reported fear; greater skin conductance response, SCR; or engagement of
escape behaviors; Carter et al., 2003; Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002). The degree of
differential fear is quantified as the difference between the CS+ versus the CS- in their elicited
CRs. Upon successful acquisition of differential fear, extinction procedures can be carried out to
inhibit the learned CS-US association (Milad & Quirk, 2012), which involves the removal of US
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from the presentations of the CS+ leading to a reduction or suppression of the acquired
differential CR. It is this precise theorizing of extinction that the foundations of many imagerybased clinical interventions such as imaginal exposure are based on (Abramowitz, 1996; Hecker,
1990; Powers et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994).
In a systematic review, Mertens, Krypotos, and Engelhard (2020) screened 1148
publications and were left with only 20 that met the criteria of including both mental imagery
manipulation and fear conditioning. The authors concluded that the existing literature only offers
“tentative confirmatory evidence” to the relationship between mental imagery and fear regulation
due to the lack of research and the high degree of methodological heterogeneity. We found two
studies that specifically evaluated the efficacy of imagery exposure in fear extinction (e.g., Agren
et al., 2017; Reddan et al., 2018) and both reported supporting evidence. Specifically, Agren et
al. (2017) found that imaginal exposure led to comparable reductions of fear as measured by
SCR to perceptual extinction. Reddan et al. (2018) reported such reductions following imagined
extinction in both neural activations and SCR upon re-exposure. In addition to the limitation of
small volume, the existing literature of imagery extinction also suffers from an over-reliance on
physiological measures. Based on the multi-system conceptualization of emotion (LeDoux &
Pine, 2016), fear is expressed through ways including the conscious feeling of fear, its behavioral
manifestations, in addition to the physiological expressions such as the ones used by Agren et al.
(2017) and Reddan et al. (2018). To better answer the research question of whether imagery can
stand in for perception in emotion regulation, specifically, if conditioned fear to a visual stimulus
can undergo extinction via exposure through its mental imagery, further examination with a more
diverse selection of outcome measures is needed.
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1.5. Measures of Fear
In the present conception of emotion, fear is a multi-component construct that involves
subjective feelings and thoughts, physiological activations, and behavioral responses (Cacioppo,
Berntson, & Klein, 1992; Gross, 1998; P. J. Lang, 1993). Consistently, outcome measures of fear
responses can also be grouped into these three categories. In this section, I will provide examples
from each category and discuss their advantages and limitations briefly.
1.5.1. Subjective Measures
Subjective measures can assess both cognitive (e.g., US expectancy, CS-US contingency
ratings; Hofmann, 2008) and affective (e.g., self-reported ratings of fear; Grégoire & Greening,
2019) aspects of fear responses. US expectancy and CS-US contingency ratings are ways to
measure contingency awareness, which refers to one’s explicit knowledge of the CS-US
relationship (Weidemann, Satkunarajah, & Lovibond, 2016). It can be collected
continuously/online (i.e., during CS presentations; R. M. K. Carter, O’Doherty, Seymour, Koch,
& Dolan, 2006), intermittently (i.e., between trials/blocks; Dibbets, Lemmens, & Voncken,
2018), or retrospectively (i.e., after experimentation; Bechara et al., 1995). The same is true for
affective evaluations. Self-reports of arousal, valence, or fear/anxiety can also be acquired online
(Rossiter & Thornton, 2004), intermittently (Grégoire & Greening, 2019), or retrospectively (H.
S. Schaefer, Larson, Davidson, & Coan, 2014). The decision on when to insert these behavioral
read-outs, however, can be a difficult one. Online or intermittent reporting of US expectancy or
CS-US contingency may draw attention to the contingency relationship itself resulting in
contingency awareness, and as a result exerts unwanted influences over fear learning (Critchley
et al., 2002; Tabbert, Stark, Kirsch, & Vaitl, 2006). On the other hand, data collected
retrospectively may lead to serious underestimations of the actual fear responses during
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conditioning (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). To date, no agreed-upon guidelines have been
established on rating procedures. The current project took the middle route and placed
questionnaires about fear ratings and CS-US contingency at the conclusions of each experimental
phase (i.e., at the end of acquisition and extinction).
1.5.2. Physiological Measures
Compared to subjective measures, psychophysiological indices have the advantages of
not being susceptible to self-report biases and allowing connections with animal research
(Lonsdorf et al., 2017). SCR and fear-potentiated startle (FPS) responses are the two most
popular choices of physiological human fear response measures (Lonsdorf et al., 2017). Other
commonly used measures include heart rate (e.g., Mueller et al., 2019; Neumann & Waters,
2006), pupillary response (e.g., Greenberg, Carlson, Cha, Hajcak, & Mujica-Parodi, 2013; Korn,
Staib, Tzovara, Castegnetti, & Bach, 2017), and respiration rate (e.g., Demaree et al., 2006;
Notarius & Levenson, 1979). Despite the aforementioned advantages, psychophysiological
measures are not free from limitations. For example, SCR can be affected by various internal
variables (e.g., age, gender), external factors (e.g., temperature and humidity), and medication
(Boucsein et al., 2012). In addition, a small percentage of the general population do not produce
measurable SCR thus limiting its application. In the case of FPS, problems arise due to startle
probes. While startle probes are required to measure FPS responses, recent studies have found
that the addition of startle probes may interfere with fear learning (de Haan et al., 2018;
Sjouwerman, Niehaus, Kuhn, & Lonsdorf, 2016). In all three studies in this investigation,
continuous recordings of SCR were collected and anconsidering the availability of previous
literature using the same measure and general guidelines for data collection and analysis (e.g.,
Boucsein et al., 2012).
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1.5.3. Behavioral Measures
Compared to subjective reports and psychophysiological activations, the third category of
behavioral responses has not been frequently employed in human fear conditioning research. In
Mertens’ review (Mertens et al., 2020), only one out of the 20 selected publications included a
behavioral measure (i.e., avoidance response; Krypotos, Mertens, Leer, & Engelhard, 2019).
Lonsdorf et al. (2017) postulated that this is due ethical and methodological considerations in
human research, that human fear conditioning paradigms are rarely intense enough to elicit a
clear behavioral response. In comparison, animal research relies heavily on behavioral measures
including freezing (e.g., Quirk, Russo, Barron, & Lebron, 2000) and approach/avoidance (e.g.,
Leiner & Fendt, 2011) considering subjective/verbal reports are not applicable in animal models.
As a result, this lack of behavioral descriptions restricts human and animal research translations
to only discussions based on physiological (e.g., Leiner & Fendt, 2011; McEchron, Tseng, &
Disterhoft, 2000) and neurological (for a review, see Delgado, Olsson, & Phelps, 2006)
responses. Among those who incorporated behavioral measures in human fear conditioning
research, many selected reaction time (RT) and it was shown to be a sensitive measure of human
fear conditioning (Lewis, O’Reilly, Khuu, & Pearson, 2013; Meulders, Vansteenwegen, &
Vlaeyen, 2011; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Silvers et al., 2016). Others forms of behavioral
measures less frequently used in human conditioning research include facial expressions (Mauss,
Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005) and avoidance behavior (Grillon, Baas,
Cornwell, & Johnson, 2006), etc.
1.5.4. Neurological Representations
In addition to subjective, physiological, and behavioral measures, another important way
of measuring fear is through neuroimaging tools. Previous functional magnetic resonance
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imaging (fMRI) studies have reported various brain regions to be associated with fear
conditioning and/or extinction, including the amygdala, anterior insula (AIC), dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC), hippocampus, precuneus, ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
and other medial prefrontal regions, etc. (M. M. R. Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008;
LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; Lissek et al., 2014; Milad et al., 2007; Phelps,
Delgado, Nearing, & Ledoux, 2004). In two recent meta-analyses, Fullana and colleagues
examined the neurological signatures of fear conditioning (Fullana et al., 2016) and fear
extinction (Fullana et al., 2018). Unlike many previous independent studies on fear conditioning,
the meta-analysis (Fullana et al., 2016) did not find robust involvement of the amygdala, instead,
the authors found consistent reporting of activations of AIC and dACC, and deactivations of
vmPFC and posterior cingulate cortex in reviewed studies. In the fear extinction meta-analysis
(Fullana et al., 2018), the authors again reported no significant amygdala involvement with
similar brain activation patterns to fear conditioning with involvement of AIC and dACC but not
vmPFC regions. Based on existing discoveries on the neural overlap between mental imagery
and perception, it is hypothesized that imagery extinction would engage similar brain regions as
perceptual extinction, perhaps more consistently in AIC and dACC.
1.6. The Need and Challenges of Employing Multiple Measures
Among the studies reviewed by Mertens et al. (2020), a wide range of measures were
recorded and analyzed, such as self-report of affective judgements (Grégoire & Greening, 2019),
US expectancy (Dibbets et al., 2018), SCR (Agren, Björkstrand, & Fredrikson, 2017), heart rate
(Mueller et al., 2019), FPS responses (Mueller et al., 2019), and fMRI activations (Reddan et al.,
2018). Comparisons between studies using different measures can only be made if these indices
can be treated interchangeably. However, most theories and studies all assumed concordance
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among the subjective, physiological, and behavioral response systems as they are regarded as the
expressions of a specific emotion (Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014), that is, that these measures
are unified expressions of the same emotion construct notwithstanding evidence suggesting that
different measures are sensitive to different aspects of an emotional state and lack a strong
connection (Mauss & Robinson, 2009).
In the case of fear, concordance means that one would exhibit a set of synchronized
responses including self-reported distress, elevated SCR amplitude, and hastened RT. Just like
the hypothesized regulatory effect of mental imagery on emotion, this concordance assumption
has not been evaluated by many. When it is put under scrutiny, however, concordance has
received inconsistent support. While some reported substantial concordance between these
categories (e.g., there were high levels of concordance between subjective and physiological
measures, Friedman, Stephens, & Thayer, 2014; and between subjective and behavioral
measures, Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994), others made the opposite conclusion of moderate to low
degrees of concordance (e.g., physiological measures only moderately correlated with subjective
feelings and behavior; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Employment of
multiple measures and the assessment of concordance between measures are needed to inform
better interpretations of results.
Challenges can emerge, however, when collections of multiple measures are carried out
simultaneously. One form of challenge has to do with experimental designs. Hollenstein and
Lanteigne (2014) reviewed and proposed three probable sources for the inconsistency in
concordance research, one of them being methodological variances. To enable a better
examination of concordance, a few considerations must be taken into account when designing a
study, with one being that the target emotion needs to be accurately and adequately evoked
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(Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014; Mauss et al., 2005) to allow the examination of concordance.
Differential fear conditioning paradigm can serve as a candidate as it provides a more stringent
test of fear conditioning compared to classical conditioning (Lockhart & Grings, 1963; Miskovic
& Keil, 2012). A second area of concern was regarding the selection of between-subject designs
by many studies while the concordance assumption refers to within-individual associations
(Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Thus, an ideal experimental design
should carry out concordance assessment within individuals. Third, is the reliance on paired
associations between pairs of measures selected from either across or within categories of
subjective, physiological, and behavioral measures (Mauss et al., 2005). Such designs failed to
capture the essence of the concordance assumption which addresses a process that has at least
three components (i.e., subjective, physiological, and behavioral; Hollenstein & Lanteigne,
2014). A more appropriate design would include one outcome measure from each of the three
categories (i.e., self-report as the subjective measure, SCR as the psychophysiological measure,
and RT as the behavioral measure) and apply multivariate analyses.
Another area of consideration is the potential interferences between measures. One
potential example of such interference is the effect of online or intermittent reporting of US
expectancy or CS-US contingency. When such measures results in changes in contingency
awareness, fear learning as measured by other read-outs would be affected (Critchley et al.,
2002; Tabbert et al., 2006). Another example is the influence of startle probes when measuring
FPS responses. Two recent publications reported changes in fear learning as measured by SCR,
fear ratings (Sjouwerman et al., 2016) and pupil dilation (de Haan et al., 2018) that were the
results of the use of startle probes. In summary, faced with the multitude of options, caution is
needed when selecting outcome measures. Considerations of the characteristics of different
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measures should be taken into account. Additional evaluations are needed when one opts to use
more than one index, as some combinations may lead to interferences between measures.
1.7. Overall Goal and Central Hypothesis
The overall goal of my dissertation is to answer the question of whether conditioned fear
to a visual stimulus can go through extinction via imagery exposure. The rationale for this
hypothesis is two-fold supported by the discussions described above. First is the powerful impact
of imagery on emotion supported by clinical, psychophysiological, and neurological evidence
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Second is the similarities and overlaps between emotional imagery
and perception in their neurological representations (Kober et al., 2008; Kreiman et al., 2000;
Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et al., 2002; A. Schaefer et al., 2003; Slotnick et al., 2005).
Evaluations were first made with self-reported fear and SCR, followed by the addition of brain
activations. An additional investigation was carried out to assess whether RT would be suitable
in the same fear learning and extinction paradigm.
1.7.1. STUDY 1: Psychophysiological Evidence for Fear Extinction Learning via Mental
Imagery
Experimental literature on imagery extinction is lacking and relied on physiological
measures of fear without considerations of subjective feelings. To determine whether extinction
of fear responses towards a perceptual stimulus through imaginal exposure to its imagery, we
conducted fear conditioning following by imagery exposure. CRs were measured and assessed in
terms of both subjective (i.e., self-reported fear) and physiological (i.e., SCR) responses. We
hypothesized that consistent with the limited literature, imaginal exposure could lead to
reductions or eliminations of conditioned fear similar to viewed extinction.
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1.7.2. STUDY 2: Psychophysiological and Neurological Evidence for Fear Extinction Learning
via Mental Imagery
In an effort to replicate our findings from self-reported fear and SCR evidence in study 1,
similar conditioning and extinction procedures were carried out with the addition of fMRI data
collection. Based on existing literature on the neurological overlap and parallels between
imagery and perception, we hypothesized that there would be measurable effects of conditioning
and extinction in brain regions that were consistently involved in fear conditioning and
extinction, i.e., dACC and AIC. Considering the inconsistencies between measures in study 1, it
is predicted that conditioned fear responses as measured by self-reported fear, SCR, and brain
activations would all or in part undergo extinction after repeated imagined exposure.
1.7.3. STUDY 3: Complete the Triangulation: Quantifying Differential Fear Conditioning With a
Noninterfering and Sensitive Behavioral Measure Along With Self-Report and Physiological
Measures
In contrast with animal research, examination of human fear conditioning has put little
emphasis on behavioral descriptions. One major area for concerns is the potential interference
that can be brought by behavioral probes during the process of concurrent behavioral tasks. To
assess whether the chosen behavioral task could offer a sensitive and non-interfering measure of
differential fear conditioning, we compared degrees of conditioning as measured by self-reported
fear and SCR between two groups of participants with one containing behavioral probes and the
other without. Based on previous RT-based human conditioning research, we hypothesized that
the behavioral probe task adopted here would be able to detect differential fear conditioning.
And considering its low task demand, it is expected that it will not cause interference with
conditioning as measured by the other two indices (i.e., self-reported fear and SCR).
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Chapter 2. Psychophysiological Evidence for Fear Extinction Learning via Mental
Imagery
2.1. Introduction
From as early as the practices of shamanism 20,000 some years ago (Achterberg, 2002)
to today’s imagery-based cognitive behavioral therapy techniques (Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker,
2007), mental imagery has been harnessed for its efficacy as a cognitive process that affects
emotion perception and regulation. It is commonly referred to as a perceptual-like experience in
the absence of external sensory input (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006), and is recognized as
an important component of various fear-related affective conditions in terms of both their
symptom presentations (e.g., intrusive images in depression, flashbacks in post-traumatic stress
disorder or PTSD; Matthews, Collins, Thakkar, & Park, 2014; Weßlau & Steil, 2014), and
clinical treatments (e.g., imaginal exposure, Abramowitz, 1996; Hecker, 1990; Powers, Halpern,
Ferenschak, Gillihan, & Foa, 2010; Turner, Beidel, & Jacob, 1994; imagery rescripting, Arntz,
2012). The primary account for the imagery’s impact in these examples is that it can substitute
for the actual stimuli in affective processes to regulate fear responses. Yet, little experimental
research has been done to support this explanation.
While some have suggested that informational processing attributed to mental imagery is
purely propositional, an abundance of behavioral and brain imaging research suggests that
mental imagery is at least partially depictive or pictorial (Kosslyn, 1981, 2005; Kosslyn, Ganis,
& Thompson, 2001). According depictive theory, mental imagery generates a neural
representation that functions like a weaker version of perception and is associated with the
subjective experience of, for example, “seeing with the mind’s eye” (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Thus,
imagery of an object can “stand in” for the corresponding external stimulus in various cognitive
processes including associative learning and other affective processes (Lewis, O’Reilly, Khuu, &
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Pearson, 2013; Pearson & Kosslyn, 2015; Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015). On the
other hand, the bio-informational theory which is directly concerned with the relationship
between imagery and emotion noted that mental imagery contains not only the perceptual
information of the imagined stimulus but also its conceptual information stored as propositions
such as “relationships, descriptions, interpretations, labels, and tags” (Lang, 1977, 1979). The
bio-informational theory posits that it is through the activation of this propositional network
during imagery that emotional modifications occur (Lang, 1977, 1979). Regardless of the precise
nature of mental imagery, it is acknowledged by both theoretical perspectives that mental
imagery has the capacity to elicit emotional characteristics similar to its perceptual counterparts.
In addition to successful clinical applications and theoretical foundations, neuroimaging research
has also provided evidence that mental imagery contributes to the elicitation or modification of
emotional reactivity. For example, meta-analytic reviews of the brain regions associated with the
emotional processing of perceptual stimuli report activations in regions such as medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula (INS), and amygdala (Kober et al., 2008;
Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002).
Importantly, activations of the same regions have been reported during elicitation of emotions
via mental imagery, including mPFC (Schaefer et al., 2003), ACC, INS (Phan et al., 2002), and
amygdala (Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000). Taken together, the existing research appears to
support the intuition that mental imagery of an emotional stimulus can substitute for its external
presentation. However, experimental research regarding the relationship between visual mental
imagery and emotion is lacking despite being a direct way to investigate the assumed
relationship between mental imagery and emotion/fear regulation.
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Among the few existing studies that investigated the connection between mental imagery
and emotion, many based their task paradigms on differential fear conditioning (Agren,
Björkstrand, & Fredrikson, 2017; Greening et al., 2021; Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Koizumi et
al., 2016; Reddan, Wager, & Schiller, 2018). Such paradigm typically involves one initially
neutral conditioned stimulus (CS+) which is repeatedly paired with an aversive or threatening
unconditioned stimulus (US; e.g., a loud noise or mild electric shock), and a second CS (CS-)
which is never accompanied by the US (Carter, Hofstotter, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2003). Upon such
pairing, the CS+ but not the CS- exhibits a conditioned responses (CR) that is similar to the type
of response elicited by US (e.g., increased self-reported fear; increased skin conductance
response, SCR; increased heart rate; or, escape behavior; Carter et al., 2003; Critchley, Mathias,
& Dolan, 2002). The acquisition of differential fear conditioning is quantified as the difference in
the CR between the CS+ versus the CS-. Greening et al. (2021) observed recently that visual
imagery of conditioned stimuli elicited a significant differential fear conditioned response as
measured by self-reported fear, SCR, and activation of the right INS. Following the acquisition
of differential fear, fear extinction learning is commonly used for inhibiting the fear conditioning
association (Milad & Quirk, 2012). It involves repeated presentations of the CS+ in the absence
of the US such that a novel safety associated memory is formed, which leads to a reduction or
suppression of the differential CR. Many imagery-based clinical interventions such as imaginal
exposure (Abramowitz, 1996; Hecker, 1990; Powers et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994) are
premised on such extinction theorizing.
Though limited in number, existing research has provided supporting evidence for the
efficacy of imagery exposure in the down-regulation of differential fear conditioning via fear
extinction (e.g., Agren et al., 2017; Reddan et al., 2018). Agren et al. (2017) found that exposure
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to either an imagined or perceptual CS+ during extinction led to comparable degrees of reduction
in SCR. Reddan et al. (2018) reported reductions in both threat-relevant neural predictive pattern
expression and SCR upon re-exposure to conditioned auditory CS+ following imagined
extinction during which participants were asked to play the conditioned CS+ tones in their head.
Koizumi et al. (2016) also managed to reduce conditioned fear responses as measured by SCR
and neural activations using counter conditioning by pairing implicit imagery of the CS+ with
monetary reward using neurofeedback. Notably, the above cited studies all relied on
physiological indices of differential conditioning without assessments of the subjective
experiences of fear. This stands in contrast to the multi-system conceptualization of emotion that
emotion is expressed through both the conscious feeling of fear and also the corresponding
behavioral and physiological expressions (LeDoux & Pine, 2016), and that over-reliance on any
single response system will be limiting to our understanding of the emotion being studied
(Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2013; Jiang, Burleigh, & Greening, 2021; Lang, 1993; Larsen & PrizmicLarsen, 2006; LeDoux & Pine, 2016).
The current study aimed to evaluate whether visual mental imagery could produce fear
extinction following the acquisition of differential fear conditioning to visual objects, in terms of
both self-reported fear and SCR. To do so, we used a within-subject design in which two CS+s
and one CS- underwent acquisition of differential conditioning (Acquisition), followed by in
vivo, perceptual extinction of one of the CS+s (CS+V) and imagery extinction of the other
(CS+I) during Extinction Phase 1. Both of the CS+s were then viewed again in Extinction Phase
2. Considering the ample evidence supporting the effectiveness of imagery-based clinical
interventions on the reduction of negative affect (Heyes, Lau, & Holmes, 2013; Holmes &
Mathews, 2010; Weßlau & Steil, 2014) and the above research findings on imagery in fear
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down-regulation (Agren et al., 2017; Koizumi et al., 2016; Reddan et al., 2018), our overall
prediction was that conditioned fear responses (as measured by both self-report and SCR) to
perceived visual stimuli would reduce after repeated imaginary exposure to the same stimuli
without the accompany of US. The accuracy of this overall prediction was evaluated on the basis
of two specific experimental predictions. First, we hypothesized that imagining the CS+I during
Extinction Phase 1 would elicit a significant CR compared to the CS-, as the fear association
would generalize from viewing the CS+I during Acquisition to imagining the CS+I during
Extinction Phase 1 (Greening et al., 2021). Second, if fear extinction learning via imagery
exposure generalized back to viewing the CS+I, then we would observe no significant
differential conditioning during Extinction Phase 2 between CS+I versus CS-. Conversely, if
imagery exposure did not produce extinction to the visual CS+I, we would predict a spontaneous
recovery of differential CR in Extinction Phase 2 as reflected in a significant difference between
the CS+I and CS-.
2.2. Method
2.2.1. Participants
A total of 61 Louisiana State University students taking undergraduate-level psychology
courses were recruited and completed this study. Five participants were removed from the final
analyses due to excessive noise in SCR throughout or a lack of SCR response to the US, i.e., the
shock, leaving a final sample of 56 individuals (32 females, mean age of 19.28, SD = 1.18;
demographic information is missing from 3 participants). This study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the Louisiana State University. Written informed consent was
given to each participant prior to the start of experiment sessions. All participants were
reimbursed by way of research credits.
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2.2.2. Stimuli
All stimuli were created and presented in MATLAB R2018a with the Psychophysics
Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Three capital letters were
selected as the CSs: letters “J” and “H” were paired with the US functioning as two distinct CS+s
and letter “F” was used as the CS- and it was never paired with the US. All stimuli were
presented at the center of the screen in 4-by-5 grids drawn on a grey background (figure 2.1 A).
A single mild electric shock of 5-ms durations as the US was delivered to the distal phalanx of
each participant’s ring finger and pinky on his/her non-dominant hand through attached
electrodes using the Biopac MP-150 system and AcqKnowledge software (for 5 participants, the
shock electrodes were placed on their index and middle fingers). Whenever the US was delivered
it co-terminated with the CS+. The intensity of the US was customized to each participant such
that it was rated as “uncomfortable but not painful.” Shock intensity was checked and adjusted
after the first half of Acquisition for each participant to avoid desensitization or sensitization to
the US.
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Figure 2.1. Letter stimuli (A), probe (B), and trial designs for view (C) and imagine (D) trials.
2.2.3. Procedures
Each participant first completed two training runs (12 trials/run) in which participants
both viewed (figure 2.1. C) or were instructed to imagine (figure 2.1. D) the selected three
letters. During each trial a probe appears, which was a single square in the grid would be filled-in
in red (figure 2.1. B) and participants were instructed identify via button press whether the probe
was on the letter viewed/imagined or off the letter. This probe task was added to the training
phrase to initially facilitate participants’ attention to the task and ensure the instructions were
understood regarding imagery. No shock was involved during this training phase of the
experiment, which allows the trials in this phase to as habituation trials for the CSs. However, no
probes were present during the remaining phases of the experiment out of a concern that they
could interfere with the differential conditioning (Carter et al., 2003).
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During fear conditioning/Acquisition (12 trials/run x 4 runs), all trials were view trials
(i.e., there was no mental imagery). The two CS+ letters were paired with shock on 50% of trials
and the CS- was never paired with shock. The order of stimuli presentation was
pseudorandomized in a way that the first and last trials were always CS- and that the second and
thirst trials were always the two CS+ stimuli with shock. The second CS+ with shock trials were
always in the second half of the run. In addition, no more than two consecutive trials were the
same. Upon completion of Acquisition, participants proceeded into the Extinction Phase 1 (12
trials/run x 2 runs) in which shock was removed from CS+ presentations. One CS+ continued to
be viewed (CS+V) and the other was imagined (CS+I) for the entire phase. The assignment of
which CS+ letter (i.e., letters “J” and “H”) was the CS+V versus the CS+I was counterbalanced
across participants. The CS- (i.e., letter “F”) was always viewed during Extinction Phase 1. The
last phase of the experiment was Extinction Phase 2 (12 trials/run x 2 runs), in which all stimuli
were viewed without the presence of electric shocks. The order of stimulus presentation for both
Extinction Phase 1 and Extinction Phase 2 was pseudorandomized with no more than two of the
same CS trials in a row. Details of the trial schedule for each phase is listed in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1. Trial schedule for each phase of the study.
Training/Habituation

Acquisition

CS+I with US

8 view trials

CS+V with US

8 view trials

Extinction Phase 1

Extinction P

CS+I without US

4 view, 4 imagine trials

8 view trials

8 imagine trials

8 view trials

CS+V without US

4 view, 4 imagine trials

8 view trials

8 view trials

8 view trials

8 view trials

8 view trials

16 view trials
CS-

4 view, 4 imagine trials

(8 excluded in
analyses)

2.2.4. Self-Report Measures
After Acquisition, Extinction Phase 1 and 2, participants were asked to complete a series
of self-report questionnaires on their level of fear towards receiving a shock, and on their
perceived likelihood of being shocked for each CS. They were instructed to report how much
they feared receiving a shock using a 7-point Likert scale (between 1 = “Not at All” and 7 =
“Very Much So”). A 10-point Likert scale (between 0% and 100% with intervals of 10%) was
provided for reporting estimations of shock likelihood.
2.2.5. Skin Conductance Response
During each trial, participants’ SCRs were collected and sampled at 2000 Hz. SCR
analysis was carried out in MATLAB R2018a (Version 9.4). A first-order Butterworth bandpass
filter was applied during preprocessing with cut-off frequencies of .01 and 5 Hz (Bach, Flandin,
Friston, & Dolan, 2010). The time series were then down-sampled to 100 Hz. Based on previous
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research (Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Schiller, Kanen, LeDoux, Monfils, & Phelps, 2013;
Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005) SCRs to the CSs were calculated
by subtracting baseline (1 second before stimulus onset) from peak amplitude (during 1-3.995
seconds after stimulus onset). Peaks were zeroed if their distance from the baseline was smaller
than .02 µS. The difference scores were then square root transformed. Consistent with previous
research (Grégoire & Greening, 2019), we only included unreinforced CS+ trials (i.e., trials
without US) in subsequent analyses. Lastly, the first and last trials of the Acquisition run were
always CS- trials, which were excluded from the analyses to avoid the potential confounding
orienting effect of the first trials, and to ensured that there was an equal number of CS+ and CStrials included in the analyses (Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Lonsdorf et al., 2017).
2.2.6. Data Analysis
Based on recommendations by Lonsdorf et al. (2017), in order to maintain the most
generalizable sample possible we only excluded participants from the analysis who displayed no
clear SCR response to the US or whose overall SCR data was of poor quality even after filtering
and down-sampling. No outlier removal was undertaken. Mean values of square-rooted SCR
were calculated for each CS types (i.e., CS+I, CS+V, and CS−) separated into Acquisition, early
Extinction Phase 1 (first half of trials), late Extinction Phase 1 (second half of trials), early
Extinction Phase 2 (first half of trials), and late Extinction Phase 2 (late half of trials). Selfreported fear and shock estimations were collected at the end of each study phase and thus were
not broken down into early and late responses for each of the three CSs. Repeated measures
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted with Greenhouse–Geisser correction for nonsphericity when needed. Post hoc paired t-tests without corrections were conducted when
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significant interactions or main effects were found (Saville, 1990). Specific analyses are
described in the results section.
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Acquisition
SCR: Acquisition was analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with CS type (i.e.,
CS+I, CS+V, and CS-) as the within-subject factor on mean SCR during Acquisition (figure
2.2.). There was a main effect of CS type, F(2, 110) = 3.80, p = .025, η2 = .06. Post hoc t-tests
revealed that while there was a significant difference between the CS+I (M = .23, SD = .21) and
the CS- (M = .17, SD = .14), t(55) = 2.59, p = .012, d = .35; the CS+V (M = .20, SD = .19) did
not differ from CS- (M = .17, SD = .14), t(55) = 1.40, p = .167. Moreover, the two CS+s (i.e.,
CS+I and CS+V) did not differ from each other, t(55) = 1.46, p = .151. Together, based on the
mean SCR, CS+I but not CS+V acquired differential fear at the group-level. Thus, we did not
include the CS+V in the subsequent analyses in the extinction phases with respect to the SCR
data.
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Figure 2.2. Mean square-rooted SCR for each CS type during Acquisition (A), and early and late
Extinction Phase 1 (B) and Extinction Phase 2 (C). Due to insignificant difference between
CS+V and CS- during Acquisition, CS+V was not included in Extinction Phase 1 and Extinction
Phase 2. Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
Self-Report: The same repeated ANOVA was applied to self-reported fear (figure 2.3. A)
and shock estimations (figure 2.3. B). In contrast to SCR, these two self-report measures
revealed differential conditioning of both CS+I and CS+V. Specifically, for self-reported fear
there was a main effects of CS-type, F(1.38, 76) = 32.59, p < .0001, η2 = .37. Post hoc t-tests
indicated that participants reported higher fear ratings for both CS+I (M = 4.20, SD = 1.63) and
CS+V (M = 4.23, SD = 1.67) compared to the CS- (M = 2.14, SD = 1.43), with respective
statistics of t(55) = 6.61, p < .0001, d = .88, and t(55) = 7.13, p < .0001, d = .95. The two CS+s
did not differ, t(55) = -.12, p = .901. As for shock estimation, a main effect of CS type was also

29

found, F(1.71, 94.22) = 59.95, p < .0001, η2 = .52. Post hoc t-tests showed that participants
reported higher likelihood of shock for both CS+I (M = 49.82, SD = 17.11) and CS+V (M =
49.64, SD = 18.39) compared to the CS- (M = 17.86, SD = 20.95): CS+I vs CS-, t(55) = 8.45, p
< .0001, d = 1.13; CS+V vs CS-, t(55) = 8.07, p < .0001, d = 1.08). The two CD+s, again, did not
differ, t(55) = .06, p = .951.

Figure 2.3. Mean self-reported fear ratings (A) and shock estimations (B) for each CS type. Error
bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
2.3.2. Extinction Phase 1: Differential Fear Generalization to CS+ Imagery
SCR: During Extinction Phase 1, participants imagined the CS+I and continued to view
the CS-, and the US was never delivered. A 2x2 ANOVA with CS-type (i.e., CS+I, CS-) and
timing (i.e., early trials, late trials) as the within subject factors were conducted on SCR data
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during Extinction Phase 1 (figure 2.2. B). This analysis revealed significant main effects for both
CS type, F(1, 55) = 21.12, p < .0001, ηp2 = .28, and timing F(1, 55) = 41.45, p < .0001, ηp2 = .43.
There was no CS type x timing interaction, F(1, 55) = 2.91, p = .094. Post hoc t-tests indicated
that CS+I was significantly different from CS- during both early (CS+I: M = .38, SD = .32; CS-:
M = .19, SD = .20), t(55) = 4.03, p < .001, d = .54; and late (CS+I: M = .22, SD = .24; CS-: M
= .11, SD = .12), t(55) = 3.55, p < .001, d = .47 trials of Extinction Phase 1. Both CS+I and CShad greater SCR during early compared to their respective late trials of Extinction Phase 1
(CS+I: t(55) = 5.53, p < .0001, d = .74; CS-: t(55) = 3.10, p = .003, d = .41). As noted
previously, CS+V was not included in SCR analyses for Extinction Phase 1 and 2. However, a
graph containing all three CSs separated into early and late Extinction Phase 1 and 2 is provided
in supplementary figure 2.S1 in Appendix A.1.
Self-Report: Results of a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with CS-type (i.e., CS+I,
CS+V, and CS-) as the within-subject factor on self-reported fear (figure 2.3. A) also supported
generalization of fear to imagery with a main effect of CS-type, F(1.75, 96.49) = 15.88, p
< .0001, ηp2 = .22. Based on post hoc t-tests, CS+I (M = 3.28, SD = 1.96) and CS+V (M = 3.16,
SD = 1.77) were both rated significantly higher than CS- (M = 1.92, SD = 1.45), with t(55) =
4.36, p < .0001, d = .58, and t(55) = 5.10, p < .0001, d = .68, respectively. The two CS+s did not
differ from each other, t(55) = .55, p = .588. These elevations of both physical and subjective
fear responses during Extinction Phase 1 were apparent despite participants’ accurate knowledge
of shock estimations (figure 2.3. B). The same one-way repeated measures ANOVA applied to
shock estimations indicated that all CS’s (i.e., CS+I, CS+V, and CS-) were reported to be paired
with shock close to 0% of the time during Extinction Phase 1 (CS+I: M = 1.84, SD = 7.16;
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CS+V: M = 1.61, SD = 6.54; CS-: M = .91, SD = 3.94) with no effect of CS type, F(1.47, 81.02)
= 1.15, p = .308.
2.3.3. Extinction Phase 2: Imagery Exposure Led to Differential Fear Extinction Learning
SCR: During Extinction Phase 2, participants now viewed both the CS+I and the CS-,
and as with Extinction Phase 1 the US was never delivered. We predicted that if mental imagery
of CS+I was effective then we would observe no main effect of CS type. As predicted, a 2x2
ANOVA with CS-type (i.e., CS+I, CS-) and timing (i.e., early and late extinction) as the within
subject factors (figure 2.2. C) resulted in no interaction (F(1, 55) = .52, p = .476) nor main
effects (CS type: F(1, 55) = .02, p = .882; timing: F(1, 55) = .49, p = .485).
Self-Report: Regarding self-reported fear, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with
CS-type (i.e., CS+I, CS+V, and CS-) as the within-subject factor (figure 2.3. A) revealed a main
effect of CS type, F(1.75, 96.24) = 14.25, p < .0001, ηp2 = .21. Importantly, a post hoc t-test
revealed no significant difference in self-reported fear for the CS+I (M = 1.70, SD = 1.06) versus
CS+V (M = 1.68, SD = 1.05), t(55) = .10, p = .924. Additional post hoc t-tests revealed higher
fear ratings for both CS+I and CS+V than the CS- (M = 1.21, SD = .68), with t(55) = 2.89, p
= .006, d = .39, and t(55) = 3.00, p = .004, d = .40, respectively. Although this result may appear
to suggest that self-reported fear was not extinguished, in the following section we carried out an
additional analysis across the 3 main experimental phases to demonstrate that the magnitude of
self-reported differential fear was reduced via both visual and imagery extinction. Regarding
self-reported shock estimation, accurate estimations were reported (figure 2.3. B) with respect to
Extinction Phase 2 with close to 0% estimations for CS+I (M = .89, SD = 5.49), CS+V (M = .38,
SD = 2.67), and CS- (M = .36, SD = 2.67) with no main effect of CS type, F(1, 55) = 1.83, p
= .182.
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2.3.4. Self-Reported Fear Across Acquisition, Extinction Phase 1 and Extinction Phase 2
In order to evaluate the magnitude of differential fear conditioning as measured by selfreport across the three main experimental phases we conducted a 3x2 ANOVA on the difference
scores of self-reported fear with study phase (i.e., Acquisition, Extinction Phase 1, Extinction
Phase 2) and CS contrast (i.e., CS+I minus CS-, CS+V minus CS-) as the within-subject factors.
This revealed only a main effect of study phase, F(1.71, 94.27) = 17.84, p < .0001, ηp2 = .24.
Notably, there was neither a main effect of CS contrast, F(1, 55) = .13, p = 721, nor interaction,
F(1.45, 79.87) = .23, p = .724. As there was no main effect of CS contrast and no interaction,
the contrast scores were averaged together (i.e., producing one aggregate measure of the CS+ vs
CS- difference) and compared between study phases. Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant
reductions from Acquisition (M = 2.07, SD = 2.48) to Extinction Phase 1 (M = 1.24, SD = 1.81),
t(55) = 2.83, p = .007, d = .38; and from Extinction Phase 1 to Extinction Phase 2 (M = .47, SD
= .77), t(55) = 3.73, p = .000, d = .50. These results suggest that the magnitude of differential
fear conditioning (CS+ minus CS-) as measured with self-reported fear significantly decreased
throughout extinction (i.e., Extinction Phase 1 and 2). Moreover, the reduction in differential
self-reported fear was the similar regardless of whether or not imagery was employed during
Extinction Phase 1.
2.4. Discussion
Mental imagery has long played an important part in our understanding and treatments of
various affective conditions. The assumption is that imagery performs like its perceptual
counterpart and can exert regulatory effects on emotion in its place. While efforts have been
made in the theorizing and assessment of imagery-based emotion regulatory strategies,
experimental examination is lacking. The current investigation sought to determine if visual
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mental imagery could contribute to fear extinction as measured by both physiology (i.e., SCR)
and self-reported fear, as this has not been done in the current literature (Agren et al., 2017;
Reddan et al., 2018). First, we found that conditioned fear acquired by visual stimuli generalized
to visual imagery as indicated by elevated SCR and self-reported fear. Second, following
repeated visual imagery of the CS+I, there was no significant differential SCR upon re-exposure
to the CS+I compared to the CS-. In addition, based on self-reported fear, imagery-based and
perceptual extinction led to similar degrees of reductions in the differential conditioned fear
response, consistent with the SCR-based findings of Agren et al. (2017).
As the main research question of the current investigation is whether imagery exposure to
the CS+ leads to fear extinction initially acquired to a perceptual (i.e., visual) CS+, our
observation of significantly greater SCR for CS+I versus the CS- during acquisition allows us to
make valid inferences regarding mental imagery’s impact on extinction despite the lack of clear
differential conditioning between the CS+V and the CS-. Our first observation supporting the
impact of mental imagery on extinction comes from the observation of the generalization of
conditioned fear from perception to imagery during Extinction Phase 1 in terms of both SCR and
self-reported fear. An alternative possibility is that the elevation of SCR when imagining the
CS+I could be the result of the act of imagery, which may require more effort than simply
viewing in the case of CS-. The initial purpose of including the CS+V during Extinction Phase 1
was to help evaluate this possibility. On the other hand, previous research on the generalization
of differential fear conditioning from visual to imagined objects did not observe evidence of an
elevated SCR response to mental imagery compared to viewing, though they did observe a
significant SCR difference between the CS+ versus the CS- (Greening et al., 2021). Another
study by Agren et al. (2017) reported that while the conditioned response measured by SCR
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difference between CS+ and CS- was initially larger in the imaginal extinction group, the
imagery and in vivo/perceptual extinction groups were comparable by late extinction. Based on
these findings, it is unlikely that the SCR difference can be completely accounted for by the
difference between viewing versus visual imagery per se, rather than being an expression of the
generalized conditioned fear response.
The second piece of evidence supporting the use of mental imagery for fear extinction
learning comes from Extinction Phase 2. Specifically, even during the early trials (i.e., the first
four trials per condition) the CS+I no longer exhibited a greater SCR compared to the CS-. Had
imagery fear extinction not affected the fear conditioned association between the perceptual in
vivo CS+I and the CS- one would have predicted a spontaneous recovery of differential
conditioning upon re-exposure to the in vivo CS+I during Extinction Phase 2 (Huff, Hernandez,
Blanding, & LaBar, 2009), which was not observed. Unlike SCR, differential fear measured as
self-reported fear did persist to some degree throughout extinction. However, this differential
was significantly reduced from Acquisition to Extinction Phase 1 and from Extinction Phase 1 to
Extinction Phase 2 irrespective of the type of CS+ (i.e., for both CS+I – CS- and CS+V – CS-).
This is in line with previous research on self-reported fear (Lau et al., 2008; Shechner et al.,
2015), and may reflect that individuals maintain stable declarative knowledge regarding the
difference between the CS+s and CS- even after extinction.
Unexpectedly, only one of the two CS+’s (i.e., CS+I) was found to exhibit threat related
differential physiological reactivity (i.e., greater SCR for CS+I vs. CS-) following the acquisition
phase in the current study. Considering that the selections of CS+I and CS+V were
counterbalanced across participants, this could not be attributed to differences between the letter
stimuli of “J” and “H”. One possibility is that the nature of the stimuli and the use of two CS+s
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in a within-subject designed made the stimulus discriminability for the purposes of differential
conditioning difficult. Additionally, compared to evolutionarily fear-relevant objects (e.g.,
images of snakes, human faces), stimuli lacking in evolutionary fear-relevance, such as the letter
stimuli used in the current study, undergo fear conditioning less readily (Öhman & Mineka,
2001). Future research could consider using more fear-relevant objects (e.g., snakes or spiders),
or a between-group design to avoid require two CS+s (e.g., Agren et al., 2017; Reddan et al.,
2018). The inconsistency observed in the current study could also be a manifestation of the noise
and measurement error in SCR.
Altogether, the present results from both SCR and self-reported fear suggest that repeated
exposure to the mental image of an in vivo CS+ can facilitate extinction learning. Both the
complementary findings and inferential similarities revealed between the subjective and
physiological measures also demonstrates the importance of collecting multiple outcome
measures based on a multi-component view of emotion (Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2013; Lang, 1993;
Larsen & Prizmic-Larsen, 2006; LeDoux & Pine, 2016). While further investigations are needed
to confirm and evaluate the underlying cognitive mechanisms of emotion regulation by affective
mental imagery, the current study along with the limited experimental literature (Agren et al.,
2017; Reddan et al., 2018) provide preliminary support for the clinical application of extinctionbased imagery treatments in fear-related affective conditions.
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Chapter 3. Psychophysiological and Neurological Evidence for Fear Extinction
Learning via Mental Imagery
3.1. Introduction
Mental imagery is the perceptual-like experience of previously perceived stimuli without
sensory input from external stimuli (Lewis et al., 2013). It has been frequently mentioned in the
literature of affective psychopathology, including anxiety, depression, bipolar, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It is recognized as an important component of both symptom
presentations of these conditions (e.g., intrusive images in depression, flashbacks in PTSD;
Matthews, Collins, Thakkar, & Park, 2014; Weßlau & Steil, 2014), and their clinical treatments,
mainly cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) techniques (e.g., imaginal exposure therapy, imagebased cognitive modification; Heyes, Lau, & Holmes, 2013; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Weßlau
& Steil, 2014). The widely used but surprising not adequately supported assumption here is the
link between mental imagery and emotion, more specifically, that mental imagery can elicit
strong emotional responses and that the latter can in turn be modified through the former.
Among the few existing studies that investigated this connection between mental imagery
and emotion, many selected task paradigms are based on associative learning (Agren et al., 2017,
2012; Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Lewis et al., 2013; Reddan et al., 2018). Briefly, associative
learning involves the acquisition of the association between an initially neutral stimulus or the
conditioned stimulus (CS), and a meaningful stimulus or the unconditioned stimulus (US; Carter,
Hofstotter, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2003). One form of associative learning that is particularly
popular is fear conditioning, in which a CS is repeatedly paired with an aversive or threatening
US (e.g., a loud noise or mild electric shock). Upon such pairing, the CS subsequently elicits fear
responses (e.g., increased heart rate, escape behavior) that were previously associated with the
US (R. M. Carter et al., 2003; Critchley et al., 2002). The learned fear responses can then be
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attenuated or eliminated with repeated exposures to the CS without the accompanying US
pairing (Agren et al., 2017).
Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have reported various
brain regions to be associated with fear conditioning and/or extinction, including amygdala,
anterior insula cortex (AIC), anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), hippocampus, precuneus, ventral
medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and other medial prefrontal regions, etc. (M. M. R. Delgado
et al., 2008; LaBar et al., 1998; Lissek et al., 2014; Milad et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2004).
However, not all of these regions were reported in these studies. This inconsistency in research
findings is mirrored by methodological heterogeneities among existing research. In two recent
meta-analyses, Fullana and colleagues examined the neurological signatures of fear conditioning
(Fullana et al., 2016) and fear extinction (Fullana et al., 2018). Unlike many previous
independent studies on fear conditioning, the meta-analysis (Fullana et al., 2016) did not find
robust involvement of the amygdala, instead, the authors found consistent reporting of
activations of AIC and dACC, and deactivations of vmPFC and posterior cingulate cortex in
reviewed studies. In the fear extinction meta-analysis (Fullana et al., 2018), the authors again
reported no significant amygdala involvement with similar brain activation patterns to fear
conditioning with involvement of AIC and dACC but not vmPFC regions.
The current study aims to determine whether fear conditioned association can undergo
the process of extinction via mental imagery, and whether such imagery-driven extinction
recruits distinct brain regions from experiential extinction learning circuitry (i.e., AIC and
dACC). Considering the ample evidence supporting the effectiveness of imagery-based clinical
interventions on the reduction of negative affect (Heyes, Lau, & Holmes, 2013; Holmes &
Mathews, 2010; Weßlau & Steil, 2014), we hypothesized that fear responses (as measured by
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both self-report, skin conductance response [SCR], and brain activations) to visual stimuli would
reduce after repeated imaginary exposure to the same stimuli without the accompany of US.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Participants
Twenty-eight undergraduate students (2 males, mean age of 20.00, SD = 2.40) completed
this study as part of a larger two-day study. The data presented here was from Day 2 of the study.
Day 1 data was described previous publication (Jiang, Burleigh, & Greening, 2021). Seven
participants were removed from SCR analyses (2 due to missing data files, 5 due to excessive
noise in SCR). Analyses on all the other measures (i.e., self-reported fear, shock estimation, and
fMRI) were based on the complete sample. This study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the Louisiana State University and written informed consent was acquired from all
participants prior to the beginning the experiment.
3.2.2. Materials
A set of three letters (i.e., “J,” “H,” and “F,” see figure 3.1. A) were used as the CSs. The
US were 100-ms mild electric stimulations which were delivered to the distal phalanx of each
participant’s ring finger and pinky on his/her non-dominant hand through attached electrodes.
The mild electric stimulation used was customized to each participant and a shock level was
selected when it was reported to be “uncomfortable but not painful” and was administered
through the STMISOC and STM100C modules of BIOPAC Systems.
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Figure 3.1. Study materials (A), probe task (B), and examples of view (C) and imagine (D) trials.
3.2.3. Procedure
The experimental paradigm and study protocol are illustrated in figure 3.2. and table 3.1.
The current study was composed of two habituations, one acquisition, and two extinctions in
order. In habituations, participants were instructed to view and imagine the CSs, i.e., “J,” “H,”
and “F”. After completion of the first habituation (habituation 1), which occurred outside the
scanner, participants proceeded with the remaining procedures in the scanner starting with the
second habituation (habituation 2). In acquisition, visual images of the CSs were presented to the
participants. The CS+s (i.e., “J” and “H”) were paired with the US 50% of the time while the CS(i.e., “F”) was never paired with the US. Following acquisition, all participants continued to the
first extinction (extinction 1) in which they were instructed to image one of the CS+s (i.e.,
CS+IV; “J” or “H,” counterbalanced across participants) and the CS-. In the second extinction
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(extinction 2) all CSs were visually presented again. Stimuli presentation scheduling details see
figure 3.2.
A separate functional localizer task was added to the end of the study. Twenty fear and
20 neutral images were selected from the International Affective Picture System (P. J. Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and the Nencki Affective Picture System (Marchewka, Żurawski,
Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014). All images were transformed into black and white and their low
level visual properties (i.e., luminance and contrast) were controlled using the SHINE Matlab
toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). The images were visually presented to each participant using
a block design (see figure 3.2. D for scheduling details). The presentation was randomized both
in terms of the block order and images within each block. Each block was presented for 10 s (2.5
s for each image) with intervals of 10 s between blocks.
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CS+IV

CS+IV

CS+IV

CS+IV

CS+V

CS+V

CS+V

CS+V

CS-

CS-

CS-

CS-

Habituation 1 outside
the scanner with probes

View
Imagine

Habituation 2 inside
the scanner without probes

CS+IV

CS+IV

CS+V

CS+IV

CS+V

CS-

CS-

CS-

Acquisition

Extinction 1

Extinction 2

Figure 3.2. Study procedure including habituation/practice 1 and 2 during which participants
viewed and imagined all three CSs (i.e., CS+IV, CS+V, CS-); acquisition where participants
viewed all three CSs and the CS+s were paired with shock 50% of the time; extinction 1, where
participants imagined CS+IV and CS-; and extinction 2, where participants viewed all CSs again.
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Table 3.1. Trial compositions for the study.

Fear Learning

Functional Localizer

Habituation 1 and 2
2 view and 2 imagine CS+IV
2 view and 2 imagine CS+V
2 view and 2 imagine CSx 2 runs

5 Fear blocks
5 Neutral blocks
(4 difference images
in each block)

Acquisition
2 view CS+IV and 2 view CS+IV/US
2 view CS+V and 2 view CS+V/US
4 view CSx 4 runs
Extinction 1
6 imagine CS+IV
6 imagine CSx 2 runs
Extinction 2
4 view CS+IV
4 view CS+V
4 view CSx 2 runs

3.2.4. Probe
Probes were added to habituation 1 as a way of making sure that participants are
picturing the letters correctly and also as a measure of how well they are able to imagine the
letters. A single square in the grid filled in in red appearing at a location randomly selected from
a set of positions on the 4 x 5 grid was used as the probe (see figure 3.1. B). The participants
were instructed to respond quickly as possible by either pressing 1 if he/she thought the probe
was on the letter presented/imagined or 2 if the probe was deemed to be off the letter. A response
window of 2s was applied. Within each run, the probe had a 50% chance to be on the target
letter. Probes were added to each trial at either 4, 5, or 6 s after stimulus onset. This
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randomization of probe timing should reduce or eliminate expectancy so that participants’
reaction time to probes were more representative of their scanning and mental formation of
images of letter stimuli.
3.2.5. Subjective Ratings
Participants were surveyed on their fear of shock and the estimated percentage of shock
paired with each CS after acquisition, extinction 1 and 2. Participants reported their fear of each
CS on a 7-point Likert scale (between 1 = “Not At All” and 7 = “Very Much So”). A 10-point
Likert scale (between 0% and 100% with intervals of 10%) was used as estimations of shock
contingency of each CS. Participants also provided self-reported evaluations of their vividness of
the mental images on a 7-point scale ranging (from 1 = “Non-Existent” to 7 = “Very Strong”)
and their effort when forming mental images on a 7-point scale ranging (from 1 = “Not At All”
to 7 = “Very Hard”). Participants were followed up after functional localizer task on their fear
levels of each image presented. A 5-point Likert scale was used here (from 1 = “Not At All” to 5
= “Very Much So”).
3.2.6. Physiological Responses Recording
Electrodermal activity was recorded with the Biopac MP-150 system and AcqKnowledge
software (BIOPAC systems, Goleta, CA, USA) and was sampled at 2000 Hz.
Analyses were carried out in MATLAB R2018a (Version 9.4) on SCR signals. A first-order
Butterworth bandpass filter was applied with cut-off frequencies of .01 and 5 Hz (Bach, Flandin,
Friston, & Dolan, 2010). Time series were then down-sampled to 100 Hz. SCRs to the CSs were
calculated by subtracting baseline (1 second before stimulus onset) from the peak amplitude
(during 1-7.9 s after stimulus onset; Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, &
Licata, 2013; Milad et al., 2007; D. Schiller, Kanen, LeDoux, Monfils, & Phelps, 2013; Daniela
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Schiller et al., 2010; Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005). Peaks were
removed if their distance from the baseline was smaller than .02 µS or if it appeared outside of
the 1-7.9 s timeframe. The difference scores were then square root transformed. Shock trials
were excluded as these SCRs may be more reflective of the unconditioned responses to the US
instead of the conditioned ones to the CS (Greening, Lee, & Mather, 2016), though these US
trials were included as nuisance regressors in first level fMRI analyses. The first and last trial of
each acquisition run was a CS- trial which was also excluded from the analyses, though they
were again included in fMRI analyses as nuisance regressors. This was done to avoid the
potential confounding orienting effect of the first trials (Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Lonsdorf et
al., 2017) and to ensure that each condition had an equal number of trials in the primary analyses.
3.2.7. MRI Data Collection and Analysis
MRI Acquisition: Participants were scanned during day two procedures from the
beginning of habituation 2 to the end of functional localizer. Imaging data was collected on a GE
MR750w 3.0T system with a 32-channel MR Instruments head coil at Pennington Biomedical
Research Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. T1-weighted structural images were acquired using a
three-dimensional fast spoiled gradient-echo (FSPGR) sequence (TR = 8.7 ms, TE = 3.8 ms, flip
angle = 8°, 256 × 256 matrix, phase encoding direction anterior to posterior, FOV = 25.6 cm).
One hundred eighty sagittal slices covering the entire brain were acquired in sequential order
producing a voxel resolution of 1mm isotropic. T2*-weighted functional scans were acquired
using gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI; TR = 2000 ms, TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 90°, 64
x 64 matrix, phase encoding direction anterior to posterior, FOV = 22.4 cm). Thirty-six axial
slices covering the whole brain were acquired with a voxel resolution of 3.5 mm isotropic with
no gap. Slices were acquired in interleaved ascending order. Each functional scan began with

45

three dummy volumes to account for equilibrium effects, and these dummy volumes were
discarded from the analyses during preprocessing. The number of volumes varied for each
portion of the experiment. Specifically, each habituation run had 130 volumes, each acquisition
run had 124 volumes, each extinction 1 run had 136 volumes, each extinction 2 run had 124
volumes, and the functional localizer run had 108 volumes.
fMRI Preprocessing and Whole-Brain Univariate Analyses: fMRI data was analyzed
using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 6.0, part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library,
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Registration to participant structural and standard space images was
carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002; Jenkinson & Smith,
2001). Pre-statistics processing applied include: motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson
et al., 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain
removal using BET (Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 7mm;
grand-mean intensity normalization by a single multiplicative factor; and highpass temporal
filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma=50.0s). The timeseries modeling was carried out using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (M. W.
Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001).
At the single-subject level each run was modelled separately. A double-gamma
hemodynamic response function convolution was used on each of the conditions of
interest/explanatory variables (i.e., CS+IV, CS+V, CS-, CS+IV/US, CS+V/US, and first and last
CS- trials in acquisition) inputted in Custom (3 column format) basic shape. Temporal
derivatives of each condition of interest were added. Several nuisance regressors were added,
including six original motion parameters, extended motion parameters, and framewise
displacement (FD) = 0.9 mm motion censoring (Siegel et al., 2014) using the fsl_motion_outliers
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function. A second-level analysis was performed to average over contrast estimates from the first
level analysis for each experimental phase (e.g., acquisition) for each participant. As noted
previously US (i.e., CS+IV/US, CS+V/US) trials and the first and last CS- trials in acquisition
were not used in higher-level analyses. These analyses were carried out using a fixed effects
model in FLAME (FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects), with the random effects variance
forced to zero (Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2003; M. Woolrich, 2008; M. W. Woolrich,
Behrens, Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004). Group-level analyses were carried out using
FLAME (FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) stage 1 (Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith,
2003; M. Woolrich, 2008; M. W. Woolrich, Behrens, Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004).
The resulting z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined
by z > 2.3 and a cluster significance threshold of p = 0.05 (Worsley, 2001).
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Acquisition
Subjective and Physiological Data: Acquisition was examined using repeated-measures
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with CS type (i.e., CS+IV, CS+V, and CS-) as the withinsubject factor on self-reported fear, mean SCR, and shock estimation separately (figure 3.3. B).
Greenhouse–Geisser correction for non-sphericity was applied when needed. Significant findings
were followed by post hoc paired t-tests without corrections (Saville, 1990). These three
ANOVAs returned consistent results with significant main effects of CS type on self-reported
fear (F(1.64, 44.26) = 70.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .72), SCR (F(1.53, 30.69) = 5.85, p = .012, ηp2
= .23), and shock estimations (F(2, 54) = 77.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .74). Post-hoc t-tests revealed
differential conditioning for both of the two CS+s (i.e., CS+IV and CS+V) on all three measures.
Specifically, participants had greater self-reported fear for CS+IV (M = 5.11, SD = 1.26; t(27) =

47

9.04, p < .0001) and CS+V(M = 5.11, SD = 1.37; t(27) = 9.46, p < .0001) than the CS- (M =
1.96, SD = 1.57). They also had larger SCR for CS+IV (M = .20, SD = .21; t(20) = 2.55, p = .02)
and CS+V(M = .20, SD = .19; t(20) = 2.72, p = .01) compared to the CS- (M = .10, SD = .11).
Higher likelihood of shock was reported for CS+IV (M = 59.29, SD = 16.31; t(27) = 9.22, p
< .0001) and CS+V (M = 58.57, SD = 14.07; t(27) = 10.88, p < .0001) than the CS- (M = 9.64,
SD = 19.53). The two CS+s did not differ on any of these measures (self-reported fear: t(27)
= .00, p = 1.00; SCR: t(20) = .00, p = 1.00; shock estimation: t(27) = .20, p = .85).

Figure 3.3. Self-reported fear (A), shock estimation (B), and mean SCR (C) during acquisition.
Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
Univariate Whole Brain Data: A network of regions associated with differential fear
conditioning (Fullana et al., 2016) were found to exhibit significant functional activation during
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acquisition. Specifically, significantly greater signals were found in parts of bilateral AIC and
bilateral dACC when viewing both CS+s compared to the CS- (figure 3.4.).
R

CS+V > CS-

CS+IV > CS-

dACC

L

dACC
x=4

CS+V > CS-

AIC

CS+IV > CS-

AIC

AIC

AIC

z = -2

2.3

4.7

Figure 3.4. Univariate whole brain analysis results during acquisition comparing CS+V and CS(left) and CS+IV and CS- (right).
Univariate Region-Of-Interest (ROI) Analysis: Based on univariate whole brain results,
ROI masks were created in left AIC (L-AIC), right AIC (R-AIC), and bilateral dACC using
meta-analysis results by Fullana et al. (2016). These ROI masks were then applied to univariate
whole brain data during acquisition. The same ANOVAs from subjective and physiological data
analyses were conducted on mean brain activations during acquisition within each ROI (figure
3.5.). Significant main effects of CS type were found in all three ROIs, including L-AIC (F(1.55,
41.85) = 3.55, p = .048, ηp2 = .12), R-AIC (F(1.56, 42.20) = 9.33, p = .001, ηp2 = .26), and
bilateral dACC (F(2, 54) = 13.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .33). Post-hoc t-tests provided support for both
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CS+s in R-AIC and bilateral dACC, and only for CS+V in L-AIC. Specifically, in R-AIC,
CS+IV (M = 2.82, SD = 1.27; t(27) = 3.70, p < .001) and CS+V (M = 2.58, SD = 1.33; t(27) =
2.89, p = .008) both had greater activations than the CS- (M = 1.52, SD = 1.65). No difference
was found between the two CS+s (t(27) = 1.06, p = .30). The same pattern was found in dACC
(CS+IV: M = 2.50, SD = 1.74; CS+V: M = 2.54, SD = 1.72; CS-: M = .88, SD = 1.66; CS+IV vs
CS-: t(27) = 4.33, p < .001 ; CS+V vs CS-: t(27) = 4.01, p < .001; CS+IV vs CS+V: t(27) = -.13,
p = .90). In L-AIC, however, differential fear was only evident for CS+V (M = 1.88, SD = 1.48;
t(27) = 2.20, p = .04) when compared with CS- (M = 1.07, SD = 1.62). CS+IV (M = 1.77, SD =
1.76) did not differ from CS- (t(27) = 1.87, p = .07) or CS+V (t(27) = -.50, p = .63).
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Block?

Figure 3.5. Results of ROI analyses of mean brain activations during each study phase in ROIs
L-AIC (A), R-AIC (B), and bilateral dACC (C). Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot
represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
3.3.2. Extinction 1
Subjective and Physiological Data: Mean SCR were separated into early (first half of
trials) and late (second half of trials) extinction 1 responses. A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA
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with CS type (i.e., CS+IV and CS-) and time (i.e., early and late) as the within-subject factors
revealed significant main effects of both CS type (F(1, 20) = 7.58, p = .01, ηp2 = .27) and time
(F(1, 20) = 4.68, p = .04, ηp2 = .19), with no interaction (F(1, 20) = 0.71, p = .410). Paired ttests were then carried out on mean SCR across early and late extinction 1 in addition to selfreported fear and shock estimation during extinction 1 to contrast CS+IV and CS- (figure 3.6.).
Results based on self-reported fear and SCR supported a generalization of differential fear from
viewing to imagining CS+IV. Specifically, CS+IV had greater self-reported fear (M = 3.18, SD
= 2.02; t(27) = 2.78, p = .01) and SCR (M = .17, SD = .11; t(20) = 2.75, p = .01) than the CS(self-reported fear: M = 2.00, SD = 1.83; SCR: M = .13, SD = .10) when imagined during
extinction 1. These elevations of subjective and physical fear responses were apparent despite
participants’ accurate knowledge of shock estimations during extinction 1. Close to 0% of shock
likelihoods were reported for both CS+IV (M = 2.75, SD = 7.55) and CS- (M = 5.00, SD =
14.78), and a paired t-test revealed no significant difference t(27) = -1.06, p = .30. Paired t-test
contrasting early and late mean SCR responses across CS type indicated that participants had
larger SCR during early extinction 1 (M = .17, SD = .12) compared to late extinction 1 (M = .14,
SD = .10), t(20) = 2.16, p = .04.
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Figure 3.6. Self-reported fear (A), shock estimation (B), and mean SCR (C) during extinction 1.
Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
Univariate Whole Brain Data: Univariate whole brain analysis contrasting imagining
CS+IV and CS- during extinction 1 yielded no significant findings.
Univariate ROI Analysis: As L-AIC ROI did not possess evidence of differential fear for
both CS+s during acquisition, it was not included in extinction analyses. Paired t-tests were
conducted on mean activations during extinction 1 within ROIs R-AIC and bilateral dACC
comparing imagining CS+IV and CS- (figure 3.5.). No significant results were found in either of
the two selected ROIs. In R-AIC, CS+IV (M = 1.19, SD = 1.87) showed no elevation compared
to CS- (M = 1.01, SD = 1.89), t(27) = .42, p = .68. The same was found in dACC, where CS+IV
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(M = .35, SD = 1.60) and CS- (M = .27, SD = 1.56) had similar levels of activations, t(27) = .19,
p = .85.
3.3.3. Extinction 2
Subjective and Physiological Data: Mean SCR were again separated into early (first half
of trials) and late (second half of trials) extinction 2 responses. A 3x2 repeated measures
ANOVA with CS type (i.e., CS+IV, CS+V, and CS-) and time (i.e., early and late) as the withinsubject factors reported significant main effects of CS type (F(2, 40) = 3.58, p = .04, ηp2 = .15)
and time (F(1, 20) = 8.52, p = .008, ηp2 = .30). No significant interaction was found (F(2, 40) =
2.10, p = .14). The same ANOVAs carried out on acquisition data were then repeated on
extinction 2 data (figure 3.7.). While self-reported fear (F(2, 54) = 6.49, p = .003, ηp2 = .19) and
SCR (F(2, 40) = 3.58, p = .037, ηp2 = .15) analyses both reported significant main effects of CS
type, post-hoc analyses yielded somewhat different results. Based on self-reported fear data,
differential fear was still apparent for both CS+s during extinction 2. Specifically, participants
reported higher levels of fear for CS+IV (M = 2.54, SD = 1.69; t(27) = 2.70, p = .01) and CS+V
(M = 2.57, SD = 1.62; t(27) = 3.42, p = .002) in contrast to the CS- (M = 1.64, SD = 1.10) with
no difference between the two CS+s, t(27) = -.13, p = .90. Paired t-tests on mean SCR, however,
provided evidence of differential fear only for the CS+V (M = .21, SD = .16; t(20) = 2.28, p
= .03) and not for the CS+IV (M = .20, SD = .18; t(20) = 2.04, p = .06) in contrast with CS- (M
= .14, SD = .11). Again, the two CS+s did not differ, t(20) = -.43, p = .67. Similar to extinction 1,
averaged SCR across early and late extinction 2 was larger during the first half (M = .21, SD
= .15) compared to the second half of trials (M = .16, SD = .13), t(20) = 2.92, p = .008.
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Figure 3.7. Self-reported fear (A), shock estimation (B), and mean SCR (C) during extinction 2.
Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
Univariate Whole Brain Data: Again, no significant findings were found by univariate
whole brain analysis during extinction 2 in any contrast pairing of CS conditions.
Univariate ROI Analysis: The same ANOVAs applied to acquisition ROI analysis were
repeated here in ROIs R-AIC and bilateral dACC (figure 3.5.). It was found that differential fear
was still evident based on mean activations in both ROIs. Specifically, there were significant
main effects of CS type in R-AIC (ηp2 = .12) and bilateral dACC (ηp2 = .33). Results of post-hoc
t-tests revealed that in R-AIC, CS+IV (M = 1.24, SD = 1.75; t(27) = 3.46, p = .002) and CS+V
(M = .81, SD = 1.29; t(27) = 2.26, p = .03) both had greater activations than the CS- (M = .13, SD
= 1.19). No difference was found between the two CS+s (t(27) = 1.36, p = .19). The same was
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true in dACC, where CS+IV (M = .47, SD = 1.25; t(27) = 2.93, p = .007) and CS+V (M = .39,
SD = 1.31; t(27) = 2.65, p = .01) had significant elevations compared to the CS- (M = -.37, SD =
1.25). Again, no difference was found between the two CS+s (t(27) = .27, p = .79).
3.4. Discussion
The current study sought to assess the assumption that mental imagery has the capacity to
regulate emotions similar to perceptual counterpart and its underlying psychophysiological and
neurological mechanisms. We found that both CS+ (i.e., CS+IV and CS+V) acquired differential
fear supported by elevations in self-reported fear and SCR. After applying ROI masks to fMRI
data, we observed evidence of differential fear in R-AIC and bilateral dACC consistent with
findings by Fullana el al. (2016) confirming the relevance of AIC and dACC in fear learning.
This conditioned fear then generalized to mental imagery captured by greater self-reported fear
coupled with SCR in CS+IV in comparison to CS- during imagery in extinction 1. However, no
such difference was found in ROIs (i.e., R-AIC and bilateral dACC). Considering that
generalized fear was evident in the other two measures (i.e., self-reported fear and SCR), this
lack of discrimination in the selected ROIs may indicate that affective perception and imagery
may involve different brain regions. Upon re-exposure to viewing CSs in extinction 2, results
from analyses of physiological responses (i.e., SCR) indicated that only CS+V but not CS+IV
still exhibited differential fear. This suggested that after repeated mental imagery exposure,
conditioned fear was no longer apparent (in the case of CS+IV). Importantly, the CS that did not
went through imagery exposure (i.e., CS+V) still evidenced differential fear indicative of a
spontaneous recovery of differential conditioning (Huff, Hernandez, Blanding, & LaBar, 2009).
This contrast between CS+IV and CS+V confirmed that fear extinction took place via imagery
exposure.
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The above descriptions of SCR results in extinction 2 provided confirmatory answers to
the main research question, however, self-reported fear and ROI analyses provided results.
Specifically, participants reported higher fear ratings for both CS+s (i.e., CS+IV and CS+V) than
the CS-; and in both ROIs (i.e., R-AIC and bilateral dACC), the two CS+s (i.e., CS+IV, CS+V)
similarly had greater activations in contrast to the CS-. This persistence of elevated self-reported
fear is consistent with previous findings (Lau et al., 2008; Shechner et al., 2015), and may be
indicative of stable declarative knowledge of CS-US pairing even after extinction. Subsequently,
this declarative knowledge may have driven the significant differential activations in AIC and
dACC (Tabbert et al., 2011). Future research may further explore this inconsistency between
SCR measures with self-reported fear and brain activations by introducing manipulations of
contingency awareness.
Taken together, findings of this investigation provided support for the assumption that
repeated exposure to the mental imagery of an CS+ can result in extinction of conditioned fear
consistent with the limited existing experimental literature (Agren et al., 2017; Reddan et al.,
2018). While findings were mostly consistent across different fear indices (i.e., self-reported
fear, SCR, and brain activations), differences emerged during extinction 2, emphasizing the
importance of recruiting multiple sources of measurement in emotion research (Frijda, 1986;
Gross, 2013; P. J. Lang, 1993; Larsen & Prizmic-Larsen, 2006; LeDoux & Pine, 2016). The
current study also confirmed that brain regions including AIC and dACC are involved in
differential fear learning (Fullana et al., 2016). However, unlike Greening et al. (2021), we did
not observe activations of the insular in response to visual imagery of conditioned stimuli. This is
perhaps the result of methodological differences. Specifically, while here the CS+ was imagined
after completion of perceptual conditioning, in Greening et al. (2021), the CS+ was imagined
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during conditioning. Further research is needed to assess brain regions involved in affective
imagery in fear conditioning.
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Chapter 4. Complete the Triangulation: Quantifying Differential Fear Conditioning
with a Noninterfering and Sensitive Behavioral Measure Along with Self-report
and Physiological Measures
4.1. Introduction
Emotions, such as fear, are multi-component construct that involve subjective feelings
and thoughts, physiological activation, and behavioral responses (Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2013;
Lang, 1993; Larsen & Prizmic-Larsen, 2006). Since the Little Albert study (Watson & Rayner,
1920), Pavlovian fear conditioning has been one of the most popular experimental paradigms in
fear research. Fear conditioning has unique translational values as the mechanisms and outcomes
of fear conditioning can be studied across a range of animal models in addition to both typical
and clinical human populations (Hofmann, 2008; Marks & Toben̂a, 1990). One type of popular
fear conditioning paradigm is differential fear conditioning, which involves two conditioned
stimuli (CS). While one (CS+) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) such as a mild
shock such that subsequent presentations of the CS+ without the US produce a conditioned
response (CR), the other CS (CS-) is never paired with the US and thus does not acquire the CR.
The differences between CR to the CS+ versus the CS- are taken as indices of fear and serve as
the measurements of conditioning.
More recently, discussions around the issue of reproducibility and replicability in fear
conditioning research have arisen (Lonsdorf et al., 2017). One subject of particular interest is the
selection of outcome measures for the quantification of the CR. Some of the most common
dependent variables in human fear conditioning literature include self-report (e.g., ratings of fear
to the CS or expectancy of US), and physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance
responses/SCRs, fear-potentiated startle responses/FPS, heart rate; Lonsdorf et al., 2017) during
CS presentations. In contrast, while research has demonstrated that following acquisition, fear
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conditioned stimuli can affect subsequent behavioral measures in tasks such as affective priming
(e.g., Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002) and dot-probe (e.g.,
Haddad, Lissek, Pine, & Lau, 2011), very few studies with human participants included
behavioral measures, such as reaction time (RT), during the acquisition phase of fear
conditioning. One cited concern is that the addition of concurrent behavioral probes may affect
the acquisition of fear conditioning itself, or interfere with the other dependent measures (Lipp,
2007). To the authors’ knowledge, this specific concern has not been addressed in previous
human conditioning studies that included a concurrent behavioral assay (e.g., visual response
probes) involving RT measures (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002; Gottfried & Dolan, 2004;
Hermans et al., 2005; Koster, Crombez, van Damme, Verschuere, & de Houwer, 2005; Morris &
Dolan, 2004; Romaniuk et al., 2010).
On the one hand, if fear conditioning can be acquired automatically then there is no
concern that concurrent behavioral probes will interfere with acquisition of differential
conditioning. For example, some studies reported that unconscious fear conditioning can be
observed under certain conditions, such as during delay conditioning but not trace conditioning
(Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2006), when differential conditioning is measured using FPS
assays such as the eye-blink startle reflex in humans instead of the SCR (Sevenster, Beckers, &
Kindt, 2014) and when the CSs are fear-relevant instead of fear-irrelevant (Esteves, Parra,
Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994). However, a systematic review by Mertens and Engelhard (2020)
concluded that there is no evidence of specific conditions under which differential fear
conditioning occurs in a strictly automatic fashion.
Considering the multi-component view that emotion cannot be captured by any measure
alone (Lang, 1968; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Rachman, 1978), it is necessary to find ways to
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incorporate behavioral descriptions in emotion research. Moreover, if fear conditioning is not
strictly an automatic process, research is needed to evaluate whether a certain behavioral probe
interferes with other outcome measures of differential conditioning (e.g., the SCR, or selfreported fear). Additionally, research is needed to evaluate whether a certain behavioral probe
produces a behavioral index that is sensitive to conditioning (e.g., differential RT to the CS+
versus the CS-). Thus, an optimal concurrent behavioral measure of differential fear conditioning
would not disrupt other measures of conditioning, and would be sensitive to differences in the
CS+ versus the CS-. One recent example is eye gaze pattern (Xia, Melinscak, & Bach, 2020),
though its utilization requires eye-tracking equipment and is limited to visually presented CSs.
Another option are traditional response-based assays of behavior such as RT as mentioned
previously (Critchley et al., 2002; Gottfried & Dolan, 2004; Hermans et al., 2005; Koster et al.,
2005; Morris & Dolan, 2004; Romaniuk et al., 2010).
Two noteworthy studies have found that a concurrent behavioral task interacts with fear
conditioning, and that the magnitude of interference increases with task demands (Carrillo,
Gabrieli, & Disterhoft, 2000; Carter, Hofstotter, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2003). Carrilo et al. (2000)
combined secondary tasks (i.e., watching silent movie, verbal shadowing) with both single-cue
and differential conditioning. Analyses of conditioned eye-blink startle indicated that while
single-cue conditioning was not affected by the distraction tasks, the degree of difference in
differential conditioning was significantly reduced in the presence of distractions. Based on SCR
analyses, Carter et al. (2003) found that both differential delay and trace conditioning are
affected by a concurrent working-memory task, though delay conditioning still occurred when
the working memory load was low (i.e., a 1-back task). While these two studies provide some
support that low-demand behavioral tasks may be carried out concurrently while conserving a
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degree of differential conditioning as measured by eye-blink startle response and SCR
separately, neither examined whether the behavioral measures (i.e., RT or accuracy) themselves
were sensitive measures of differential fear conditioning. Moreover, neither study evaluated
subjective fear response, leaving the triangulation of fear incomplete with only physiological but
not subjective or behavioral descriptions.
The scarcity of behavioral assays in human fear conditioning research stands in strong
contrast to animal models, which rely greatly on behavioral measures such as freezing (e.g.,
Quirk, Russo, Barron, & Lebron, 2000) and approach/avoidance (e.g., Leiner & Fendt, 2011)
behaviors. Considering that subjective/verbal reports do not apply to animal research, the lack of
behavioral descriptions restricts translations between human and animal research to
physiological (e.g., Leiner & Fendt, 2011; McEchron, Tseng, & Disterhoft, 2000) and
neurological (for a review, see Delgado, Olsson, & Phelps, 2006) responses. With the support of
non-interfering behavioral probes and sensitive behavioral measures, researchers can bridge this
gap in translational studies. Further, this would allow simultaneous employment of behavioral in
addition to verbal and psychophysiological measures echoing the multi-component view that
emotion cannot be captured by any measure alone (Lang, 1968; Mauss & Robinson, 2009;
Rachman, 1978). Indeed, evidence suggests that although subjective, behavioral, and
physiological measures are meant to quantify the same construct of emotion, they do not
necessarily converge (Hollenstein & Crowell, 2014; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). One explanation
for this is that the various measures reflect independent sources of information which combine in
specific patterns to reflect a given emotion (Bulteel et al., 2014; Kragel & LaBar, 2013). Thus, a
diverse pool of outcome measures is required for a comprehensive quantification of fear. An
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ideal design would include indices from all of the above three categories (i.e., subjective,
behavioral, and physiological) constituting a complete triangulation of fear.
The primary purpose of the current study was twofold. First, the present study sought to
assess whether a basic visual attention task influenced differential visual fear conditioning as
measured by subjective (i.e., self-reported fear, shock estimation) and physiological (i.e., SCR)
measures. Second, the study aimed to determine if the corresponding behavioral measure
associated with the attention task (i.e., RT) was sensitive to differential conditioning as indicated
by a significant difference between the CS+ and the CS-. The study also considered an
exploratory investigation of the relationship between the different measures, including selfreported fear, shock estimation, SCR, and RT.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants
One hundred and sixty-nine undergraduate students completed this study as day 1 of a
two-day study. This study was conducted in a 30-minute session, which precluded the collection
of individual differences measures, including demographic information. Regarding the full
sample (N = 169), data from 7 participants were excluded (2 due to excessive noise, 2 due to lack
of SCR response to any presentation of the US via visual inspection, 2 due to incomplete missing
data, 1 due to invalid self-report data, i.e., scoring outside of provided range) leaving a total
sample of 162 individuals recruited from the undergraduate research pool at Louisiana State
University. The participants were further randomly assigned to one of two groups: the probe
group (n = 86) or the no-probe group (n = 76). Probes were added in habituation/training for both
groups, and during acquisition for the probe group only. Our chosen sample size was selected
based on existing literature of similar studies. An examination of differential fear conditioning
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studies that included either SCR or RT measures returned a wide range of numbers with the
lowest found of 6 subjects per group with a total of 36 participants (Carter et al., 2003)to the
highest found of a within-subject design with 66 subjects (Koster et al., 2005). We aimed to
collected 70-80 participants per group. The data presented in this manuscript were from a study
completed during Day 1 of a two-day protocol in which a sub-sample of the participants
completed an independent study on their second visit (the Day 2 data will be described in a
future publication). This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Louisiana
State University and written informed consent was acquired from all participants prior to the
beginning the experiment.
4.2.2. Materials
Two letters (i.e., “L” and “O”) drawn on 4 by 5 grids were selected as the CSs (see figure
4.1. A). These two letters were selected to minimize overlap between the two CSs on the grid.
While they differ in terms of number of composing pixels, the selection of which letter was CS+
and which was CS- was counterbalanced across participants. The USs were 100-ms mild electric
stimulations which were delivered to the distal phalanx of each participant’s ring and pinky
finger on their non-dominant hand through attached electrodes. The mild electric stimulation was
customized to each participant such that the intensity of the shock was set to a level that was
“uncomfortable but not painful” and was administered through the STMISOC and STM100C
modules of BIOPAC Systems (mean intensity = 1.61 mA, SD= 1.16).
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Figure 4.1. Letter stimuli (A), probe (B), and trial design (C).
4.2.3. Procedure
The study was composed of one habituation run and one acquisition run. In habituation,
participants were instructed to view and imagine both CSs (i.e., “L” and “O”). The habituation
run consisted of 6 trials of each of the four CS identity and modality combinations (i.e., view
CS+, imagine CS+, view CS-, imagine CS-) leading to a total of 24 trials. In acquisition, the
visual images of CSs were presented to the participants with the instruction to observe the
stimuli. The CS+ was always paired the US (i.e., 100% reinforcement rate) while the CS- was
never paired with the US (i.e., 0%). The acquisition run contained 8 view CS+ trials and 8 view
CS- trials. Each trial began with a fixation point at the center of the screen for 2 s. Next, one of
the two CSs was presented for 8 s ending with another fixation of 10 s (figure 4.1. C). Mild
electrical stimulation was delivered on every CS+, 7.9 s after CS+ onset and co-terminated with
the stimulus.
4.2.4. Probe
The habituation phase was used as practice for the behavioral probe task. Probes were
added to each trial at either 4, 5, or 6 s after stimulus onset. On a given trial a probe was
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randomly placed in a single square in the 4 x 5 grid (see figure 4.1. B). Within each run, the
probe had a 50% chance of being on the target letter. Participants were instructed to indicate if
the probe was on or off the letter by responding as quickly and accurately as possible via button
press with their dominant hand. The probe timing was randomized to reduce or eliminate
expectancy. All participants went through the same habituation procedure. For those in the probe
group, probes were also presented during acquisition. Specifically, probes were added to each
trial at either 4.5, 5, 5.5, or 6 s after stimulus onset. Any response that took place longer than 2 s
after probe onset was not recorded.
4.2.5. Subjective Ratings
At the end of the experimental task, participants were surveyed on their self-reported fear
of receiving a shock and their shock estimation after acquisition (i.e., their estimate of the
percentage trials that were paired with shock) for each CS. Participants reported their fear of
each CS on a 7-point Likert scale (between 1 = “Not at All” and 7 = “Very Much So”). A 10point Likert scale (between 0% and 100% with intervals of 10%) was provided for participants’
estimations of shock for each CS.
4.2.6. Physiological Responses Recording
Electrodermal activity was recorded with the Biopac MP-150 system and AcqKnowledge
software (BIOPAC systems, Goleta, CA, USA) and was sampled at 2000 Hz. SCR analysis was
carried out in Matlab R2018a (Version 9.4). During preprocessing, a first-order Butterworth
bandpass filter was applied with cut-off frequencies of .01 and 5 Hz (Bach, Flandin, Friston, &
Dolan, 2010). Time series were then down-sampled to 100 Hz. Based on previous research (e.g.,
Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013; Milad et al., 2007; D.
Schiller, Kanen, LeDoux, Monfils, & Phelps, 2013; Daniela Schiller et al., 2010; Vervliet,
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Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005), SCRs to the CSs were calculated by
subtracting baseline (1 second before stimulus onset) from the peak amplitude (during 1-7.9
seconds after stimulus onset). Peaks were removed if their distance from the baseline was
smaller than .02 µS or if it did not appear in the 1 to 7.9 s timeframe. The difference scores were
then square root transformed. The first two trials of the acquisition run were always a CS- trial
then a CS+ trial, respectively, which were excluded from the analyses to avoid the potential
confounding orienting effect of the first trials, and to avoid including data from a CS+ trial prior
to the association with the US actually occurring (Grégoire & Greening, 2019; Lonsdorf et al.,
2017). This also ensured that there was an equal number of CS+ and CS- trials included in the
analysis.
4.2.7. Probe Task Behavioral Responses
RT and accuracy during the probe task (probe group only) were collected and analyzed.
The first two trials were removed, consistent with SCR data analysis. The RT of each participant
was averaged across trials for each stimulus type (i.e., CS+ and CS-), and only correct trials were
included (i.e., pressing 1 when the probe was on the letter, or pressing 2 when the probe was off
the letter). Accuracy was averaged across all trials including both probe on the letter and probe
off the letter trials.
4.2.8. Data Analysis
Based on recommendations by Lonsdorf et al. (2017), the following analyses were
conducted on the complete sample (n = 162; probe group, n = 86; no probe group, n = 76)
without outlier removals. The primary research question is whether the addition of the visual
attention task described above (i.e., probe task) would affect differential fear conditioning. The
secondary question of the study asked whether the visual attention task was a sensitive
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behavioral fear conditioning measure. To answer these two questions, separate mixed model
ANOVAs were conducted on self-reported fear, shock likelihood estimations, and SCR, with CS
type (i.e., CS+, CS-) as the within subject factor and probe task assignment (i.e., probe group, no
probe group) as the grouping factor.
In a previous study examining the effect of inserting an additional outcome measure in
fear acquisition, Sjouwerman et al. (2016) demonstrated that the inclusion of startle probes
delayed the acquisition of differential fear responses in terms of SCR and fear ratings. Moreover,
task uncertainty, such as the temporal uncertainty with respect to probe onset during trials in the
present study, can increase vigilance thereby potentially affecting the acquisition rate of
differential conditioning (Morriss, Gell, & van Reekum, 2019). To assess whether behavioral
probes in the current study affected the rate of acquisition, a 2x2 ANOVA with timing (i.e.,
early, late) as the within subjects factor and probe group assignmeny (i.e., probe group, no probe
group) was conducted on differential SCR data (i.e., CS+ - CS-). As stated earlier, the first two
trials (one CS- and one CS+) were excluded in SCR analyses. Thus, the SCR responding here is
separated into eary and late conditioning by averaging between trials 2-4 and 6-8 respetively.
Self-reported fear is only collected after completion of conditioning and thus is not analyzed
here.
Considering that SCR is sensitive to error detection (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons,
2003), a follow-up paired t-test was carried out contrasting SCR during correct and incorrect
trials using data from the probe group. After observing larger differential SCR on error trials, we
sought to determine if either higher arousal/SCR prior to probe onset increased the number of
errors or if it was error detection that led to an increased SCR after probe onset. Thus, SCR was
divided into early/before probe (i.e., 1-4.5 s after stimulus onset) and late/after probe (i.e., 4.5-
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7.9 s after stimulus onset) components, followed by a 2x2 ANOVA with timing (i.e., before
probe, after probe) and key press accuracy (i.e., correct, incorrect) as the within subject factor.
The study also undertook exploratory individual differences analyses aimed to investigate the
degree of response synchronization and response patterning observed between the different
measures of fear conditioning. Response synchronization refers to the degree of similarity
between measures, which we operationalized as correlations between each pair of the selected
measurements. Considering the potential influence of contingency awareness on differential
conditioning (Critchley et al., 2002; Tabbert, Stark, Kirsch, & Vaitl, 2006; Weidemann,
Satkunarajah, & Lovibond, 2016), our shock estimation measure was also included in the
analyses. Correlation analyses were conducted on difference scores between CSs (i.e., CS+ CS-) as indicators of differential fear conditioning discriminability. Response patterning, on the
other hand, refers to the degree of unique patterning found between various dependent measures
that combine to produce an emotional state. In other words, one would also expect that when it
comes to predicting individual differences in self-reported fear, the other dependent measures
should be unique explanatory variables (i.e., they should explain unique variance in self-reported
fear). Separate multiple regression analyses were performed on the SCR, shock estimation
(complete sample and probe group), and RT (probe group only) entered as predictors for
predicting self-reported fear.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. The Influence of a Basic Visual Attention Task on Differential Conditioning
Evidence of successful fear conditioning was found in both the no-probe group and the
probe group as indicated by higher ratings of fear and shock estimation, larger SCR components,
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and faster probe task responses during CS+ compared to CS- presentations. Results from each of
these measures are reported in the remainder of this section.
4.3.1.1. Self-Report Data
Self-reported fear data revealed a significant main effect of CS type, F(1, 160) = 237.52,
p < .001, ηp2 = .60. There was no main effect of probe task assignment F(1, 160) = .36, p > .05;
nor an interaction between CS type and probe task, F(1, 160) = 1.20, p > .05. Follow-up paired ttests (figure 4.2. A) confirmed the success of differential fear conditioning, with greater selfreported fear in CS+ than CS- in both probe and no probe groups. Specifically, participants in the
probe group reported significantly higher levels of fear in CS+ (M = 4.17, SD = 1.80) than in CS(M = 1.71, SD = 1.30) trials, t(85) = 9.69, p < .0001, d = 1.04. The same was true in the no probe
group where CS+ fear ratings (M = 4.46, SD = 1.60) were higher than CS- fear ratings (M = 1.62,
SD = 1.23), t(75) = 12.55, p < .0001, d = 1.44.
The same pattern was found in the shock estimation data. There was a significant main
effect of CS type, F(1, 160) = 395.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .71. No main effect of probe task
assignment, F(1, 160) = .06, p > .05; nor interaction, F(1, 160) = .97, p > .05. Follow-up paired ttests (figure 4.2. B) found significantly higher estimations of shock in CS+ than CS- in probe
(CS+: M = .83, SD = .26; CS-: M = .15, SD = .24; t(85) = 13.19, p < .0001, d = 1.42) and no
probe groups (CS+: M = .86, SD = .22; CS-: M = .11, SD = .22; t(75) = 15.14, p < .0001, d =
1.74).
4.3.1.2. SCR Data
SCR results were consistent with the self-report data. There was a significant main effect
of CS type, F(1, 160) = 89.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Neither main effect of probe task assignment,
F(1, 160) = 3.52, p > .05; nor the interaction, F(1, 160) = 3.77, p > .05 were significant.
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According to the follow-up paired t-tests (figure 4.2. C), the probe group had significantly larger
SCR on CS+ (M = .31, SD = .29) than CS- (M = .17, SD = .18) trials, t(85) = 5.68, p < .0001, d =
.61. The same was observed in the no probe group, with SCR on CS+ trials (M = .41, SD = .31)
significantly greater than on the CS- trials (M = .19, SD = .19), t(75) = 7.55, p < .0001, d = .87.

Figure 4.2. Effects of CS type (i.e., CS+, CS-) and probe task grouping (i.e., probe group, no
probe group) on self-reported fear (A), shock estimations (B), and SCR (C). Comparison of RT
between CS+ and CS- in the probe group (D). Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot
represents one subject.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. **** p < .0001.
To evaluate whether the presence of probes affect the rate of acquisition we compared
early and late differential conditioning (i.e., CS+ - CS-) across groups. Importantly, we observed
neither a significant probe task by time interaction (F(1, 160) = .00, p > .05) nor a main effect of
group (F(1, 160) = 3.06, p > .05). This indicated that the presences of the behavioral probes did
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affect the magnitude of differential conditioning over time (early versus late acquisition). There
was, however, a significant main effect of time, F(1, 160) = 6.20, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, suggesting
that SCR difference scores were higher during early acquisition (M = .21, SD = .32) than late
acquisition (M = .14, SD = .29). See supplementary figure 4.S1 in Appendix A.2. for trial-bytrial data.
4.3.2. Influence of Differential Fear Conditioning on Behavior
As the probe group also provided behavioral data, we analyzed RT and accuracy for the
probe group. A paired t-test revealed that participants were faster (i.e., lower RT) at responding
to probes on CS+ trials (M = .75, SD = .20) compared with CS- trials (M = .79, SD = .21), t(85) =
-2.64, p < .01, d = -.29 (figure 4.2. D). Another paired t-test revealed no significant difference in
accuracy between CS+ (M = .87, SD = .17) and CS- (M = .87, SD = .17), p > .05.
While RT was averaged across only correct trials, SCR was derived from both correct and
incorrect trials. To assess whether behavioral performance influenced SCR, a paired t-test was
conducted comparing SCR on correct versus incorrect trials. It revealed that SCRs were smaller
in correct trials (M = .25, SD = .20) than in incorrect trials (M = .36, SD = .39), t(64) = -2.88, p <
.01, d = -.37. Two potential explanations could account for this difference: 1) higher arousal/SCR
prior to the behavioral probe onset led to more mistakes; or 2) errors during the probe task
caused elevations in SCR following probe onset. Out of the 85 participants in the probe group,
21 responded with 100% accuracy. Based on SCR data from the remaining 65 participants in the
probe group, a 2x2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between timing (i.e., before probe,
after probe) and key press accuracy (i.e., correct vs. incorrect), F(1, 64) = 6.43, p < .05, ηp2 = .09.
Follow-up t-tests revealed that SCR was larger on incorrect trials only after probe (correct trials:
M = .19, SD = .19; incorrect trials: M = .28, SD = .37; t(64) = -2.34, p < .05, d = -.22), not before
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probe (correct trials: M = .13, SD = .17; incorrect trials: M = .17, SD = .29; t(64) = -1.05, p >
.01; figure 4.3.). Together these findings are consistent with the explanation that errors cause a
larger SCR and rule out the explanation that a larger SCR early-on to the CSs causes the errors.

Figure 4.3. Effects of timing (i.e., before or after probe) and key press accuracy (i.e., correct,
incorrect) on SCR. Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one subject.
* p < .05.
4.3.3. Correlations Between Measures
Based on data from the complete sample (figure 4.4. A), there were significant
correlations between self-reported fear and SCR difference scores, r(160) = .31, p < .001; SCR
and shock estimations, r(160) = .28, p < .001; and self-reported fear and shock estimations,
r(160) = .60, p < .001. This remained true when evaluating the two groups separately.
Specifically, in the no probe group (figure 4.4. B), there were significant correlations between
self-reported fear and SCR difference scores, r(74) = .34, p < .01; SCR and shock estimations,
r(74) = .34, p < .01; and self-reported fear and shock estimations, r(74) = .53, p < .001. In the
probe group (figure 4.4. C), there were significant correlations between self-reported fear and
SCR difference scores, r(84) = .28, p < .01; SCR and shock estimations, r(84) = .21, p < .05; and
self-reported fear and shock estimations, r(84) = .64, p < .001. Examining the relationship
between the RT and the other measures was only possible in the probe group. This revealed no
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significant correlations between differential RT and differential self-reported fear (r(84) = .14, p
> .05), SCR (r(84) = -.14, p > .05), or shock estimations (r(84) = .02, p > .05).

Figure 4.4. Correlations between pairs of outcome measure difference scores (CS+ - CS-) for all
participants (A), no probe group only (B), and probe group only (C). Crossed out cells indicate
insignificant correlations (p > .05).
4.3.4. Multiple Regression Predicting Self-Reported Fear
Three linear multiple regression models were carried out to test if self-reported fear can
be predicted by the other outcome measures. Based on an analysis of the complete sample, shock
estimation and SCR together explained 38.56% of the variance in self-reported fear (F(2, 159) =
49.88, p < .001), and both shock estimation (β = 2.68, p < .001) and SCR (β = 1.42, p < .05) were
significant predictors. A second model included RT as a predictor using data from only the probe
group. Results indicated that shock estimation, SCR, and RT explained 45.89% of the variance in
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self-reported fear (F(3, 82) = 23.18, p < .001). Shock estimation (β = 2.99, p < .001) and SCR (β
= 1.76, p < .05) were significant predictors, but not RT (β = 2.64, p > .05). To determine whether
the addition of RT led to an improvement of the predictive model, another model without RT
was assessed based on probe group data. In this model, shock estimation and SCR explained
43.61% of the variance in self-reported fear (F(2, 83) = 32.09, p < .001) with shock estimation
being a significant predictor (β = 3.03, p < .001) but not SCR (β = 1.52, p > .05). Comparing to
this model, an F-test revealed that the addition of RT in the second model did not have a
significant improvement in model fit (F(1, 83) = 3.46, p > .05).
4.4. Discussion
Compared to verbal and physiological indices, behavioral measures are much less
frequently used in human Pavlovian/classical conditioning studies. The lack of behavioral
measures, such as RT, restricts translations between human and animal research. It also limits
one’s ability to fully evaluate fear (in the case of fear conditioning) as a multi-component
construct (Lang, 1968; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Rachman, 1978). One of the concerns
regarding inserting concurrent behavioral tasks during the acquisition phase of differential fear
conditioning is that a behavioral probes might interfere with acquisition due to processes such as
distraction (Lipp, 2007). Consistent with this concern, some researchers have reported a
reduction in fear conditioning in the company of demanding secondary tasks (Carrillo et al.,
2000; Carter et al., 2003). In the present study, a simple visual attention task employing
behavioral probes was evaluated as a concurrent behavioral measure that would not interfere
with differential fear conditioning as measured by self-reported fear and SCR. Specifically, we
compared differential fear conditioning alone (i.e., no probe group) to conditioning with a
secondary visual attention task (i.e., probe group).
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Results from the present study demonstrated that the addition of behavioral probes (i.e.,
visual attention task in the current study) did not interfere with fear conditioning as measured
with SCR and self-reported fear collected immediately following the acquisition trials. Both
probe and no probe groups exhibited successful fear conditioning as indicated by greater selfreported fear, larger shock estimations, and higher SCR for CS+ compared to CS-. Group
assignment did not make a difference in fear conditioning based on any of these measures. These
results are consistent with research findings that simple tasks with a low cognitive demand cause
little or no interference on the acquisition of differential conditioning (Carrillo et al., 2000;
Carter et al., 2003) as accuracy of the current probe task was relatively high for both CS+ and
CS- with the same average of 87% accuracy. Further, unlike the findings on startle probes in
Sjouwerman et al. (2016), the addition of behavioral probes in the current study did not delay or
affect the magnitude of fear learning supported by the lack of a two-way interaction between
probe group and acquisition time and a non-significant main effect of probe group on differential
SCR (i.e., CS+ - CS-). The concurrent behavioral task in the present study was also a sensitive
behavioral measure of fear conditioning. Specifically, RT was shorter during CS+ trials than CStrials, consistent with previous human differential fear research findings (Critchley et al., 2002;
Gottfried & Dolan, 2004; Hermans et al., 2005; Koster et al., 2005; Morris & Dolan, 2004;
Romaniuk et al., 2010).
One consideration did, however, emerge regarding the behavioral task and its influence
on the SCR. Specifically, it was found that incorrect trials were associated with a larger
differential SCR than correct trials. A follow-up analysis found that while SCR did not differ
between correct and incorrect trials before probes, there was a significant SCR increase during
incorrect trials after probe presentations. One interpretation of this effect is that participants
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detected their errors during the behavioral task which resulted in greater arousal, as indicated by
elevated SCR (Hajcak et al., 2003). It should be noted that as accuracy was very high (86%) on
the behavioral task there were relatively few error trials, with 21 participants making no errors at
all. Thus, the impact of error trials when pooled with correct trials did not significantly influence
the differential SCR magnitude as compared to the no probe group.
Taken together, results from the current study support the inclusion of the described
visual attention task in differential fear conditioning research as a behavioral measure of
conditioning that does not interfere with other measures of conditioning such as SCR or selfreport measures. Considering the influence of incorrect responses/error detection on SCR, future
research adopting a similar experimental design may need to account for this by either excluding
incorrect trials or sampling SCR from before the onset of the behavioral probes. As it is a
common practice when analyzing RTs to average across correct responses (e.g., Derryberry &
Reed, 2002; Oliver & Page, 2003; Yates, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010), it would be consistent to use
the same procedure when processing the SCR data. As for the second alternative of extracting
SCR from a time window before probes, depending on the temporal design, such analysis may
unintentionally cross over with the literature of first- and second-interval SCR in fear
conditioning (Jentsch, Wolf, & Merz, 2020; Luck & Lipp, 2016). Additionally, while the current
CS presentation time of 8 s allowed for parcellating the epoch in two sufficiently large windows
of time, shorter presentation times might not support such a parcellation considering the latency
of SCR (R. Sjouwerman & Lonsdorf, 2019). A third possibility is to ensure that accuracy on the
behavioral task is sufficiently high such that error trials will have a negligible effect on the mean
SCR, which also appears to have been the case in the present study.
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Given the relatively large sample size and the inclusion of the behavioral measure, the
current study was also able to examine the relationship between subjective, physiological, and
behavioral measures. We observed that while there were significant correlations between
subjective (i.e., self-reported fear, shock estimations) and physiological (i.e., SCR) measures
consistent with Friedman et al. (2014), the behavioral measure (i.e., RT) did not correlate with
the subjective nor physiological measures, which is inconsistent with Mauss et al. (2005) who
reported concordance between subjective, behavioral, and physiological measures. Some
methodological differences might explain the discrepant findings. First, the present study used
RT, while Mauss et al. (2005) selected facial behavior (i.e., facial expression) as the behavioral
measure. Second, the emotional responses in Mauss et al. (2005) were elicited by film-watching
instead of differential fear conditioning. Third, while the present study collected the self-reported
data immediately following the experimental manipulation, Mauss et al. (2005) collected their
subjective measure concurrent with their task.
In addition to the correlation measures, we also observed that we could explain a
significant portion of the variance in self-reported fear using the other measures including shock
estimation and SCR. The addition of RT, however, did not lead to an improvement in model fit.
Together, results from the current investigation suggest that while RT was a sensitive measure of
differential fear conditioning, it did not converge with the other measures, including self-reported
fear, shock estimations, and SCR. This is consistent with previous findings that emotion is
multiply determined and cannot be accounted for by a single measure (Hollenstein & Crowell,
2014; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). The lack of correlation between RT and other measures needs
some additional consideration. One potential factor is that the low task-demand produced a
narrow range of between-subject variances, which is sub-optimal for individual differences
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analyses (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). While increasing the difficulty of the behavioral task
may improve the between-subject variance, higher task demand may result in significant
interference with differential conditioning itself (Carrillo et al., 2000; Carter et al., 2003). Further
research is needed to establish whether or not between-subject variance could be increased
without disrupted acquisition of differential conditioning and where the balance might lie, as
well as to clarify the relationships across and within subjective, physiological, and behavioral
descriptions of emotion.
A couple of limitations are worth noting and discussing. First, although we observed that
the simple visual attention task described here did not affect differential conditioning as
measured with SCR and self-reported fear, it is unclear how our task might affect other measures
of differential conditioning. For example, future research should consider the impact of a simple
visual attention task on the brain activity associated with differential conditioning. Second, we
did not collect any individual personality characteristics data, such as state anxiety. Such
measures should be incorporated into future research considering that previous literature
(Lonsdorf et al., 2019) has found individual differences in state anxiety to be influential over
differential fear learning.
In summary, the present investigation provides important new evidence that a simple
behavioral task can be performed along with differential fear conditioning, such that it does not
interfere with other measures (i.e., self-reported fear and SCR) of differential condition and is
itself a sensitive measure of fear conditioning. In addition, the individual difference findings (i.e.,
correlations and multiple regression) emphasize the value of measuring the multi-components of
emotion in the advancement of our basic understanding of emotions such as fear.
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Chapter 5. General Discussion and Future Directions
The main goal of the current investigation is to experimentally evaluate the assumption
that extinction of conditioned fear towards a perceptual stimulus can take place through
imagined exposure to its imagery. We observed that conditioned fear responses underwent
extinction during imagined exposure supported by the lack of spontaneous recovery upon reexposure. In addition to providing supporting evidence for the central research hypothesis, the
three studies discussed here also strengthened the importance of multi-component assessments
when it comes to emotions such as fear. Specifically, that different forms of fear expressions
were not always consistent. The following sections of the general discussion will summarize the
three studies’ findings, discuss their implications, and some limitations along with future
directions.
5.1. Acquisition of Differential Fear
The requirement of successful conditioning must first be met before one can examine the
extinction of the acquired fear responses. All three studies from this investigation shared a
similar design of differential fear conditioning with the same material for CS (i.e., letters) and
US (i.e., shock). Successful conditioning was achieved across all three studies, with the
exception of one of the two CS+s in study 1 as measured by SCR. It is worth noting, however,
that while this specific CS+ in study 1 failed to exhibit SCR evidence of discrimination between
CS+ and CS-, self-reported fear and shock estimations were supportive of differential fear. Thus,
the issue here may be partially a product of SCR noise and measurement error. When placed in
the context of the whole inquiry with the remaining measurements in study 1 and the other two
studies showing consistent and apparent CS+-CS- discrimination, one may speculate that this
unexpected case of incomplete conditioning in study 1 was likely the result of methodological
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variances, including number of CSs, CS presentation duration, CS-US contingency, and US
duration. Explicitly, study 1 included two CS+s while study 3 only had one. Also, the CSs in
study 1 were presented for 4 s which is half of the duration in study 3. In addition, study 1 had a
lower CS-US contingency, i.e., the CS+s were paired with the US 50% of the time, while the
CS+ in study 3 always co-terminated with the US. Further, the US in study 3 was set to extend a
period of 100 ms, in contrast to a duration of 5 ms in study 1. While study 2 has the same
number of CS+s and an identical CS-US contingency as study 1, study 2 had the benefits of
longer periods of both CS (i.e., 8 s) and US (i.e., 100 ms) presentations. Future studies using a
similar fear conditioning paradigm should choose experiment parameters similar to either study 2
or 3 to ensure robust SCR conditioning results.
With that being said, the unconditioned CS+ in study 1 (i.e., CS+V) was less relevant to
the main research question. The CS+ that went through imaginal exposure (i.e., CS+I) in study 1
was found to have successfully acquired differential SCR fear responses in addition to selfreported fear, which permitted examination of extinction processes during imagination.
Additionally, with the aforementioned adjustments in conditioning procedure, the CS+ in study 1
and the two CS+s in study 2 (i.e., the one that went through imaginal exposure/CS+IV and the
one that did not/CS+V) both exhibited evidence of conditioning as measured by self-reported
fear (studies 2 and 3), SCR (studies 2 and 3), and brain activations (study 3). Further support
comes from the RT-based behavioral measurement in study 3 which evinced discrimination
between CS+ and CS- despite the low task demand. Taken together, the current conditioning
design was effective in eliciting differential fear as measured by the selected indices.
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5.2. Generalization of Fear From Perception to Imagery
After conditioning was verified, generalization from perception to imagery must also be
determined. Based on analyses done on data from studies 1 and 2, participants reported higher
levels of fear and had larger SCRs when imagining CS+ in comparison to CS- providing support
for the generalization of fear acquired to viewing CS+ to its mental imagery. Further, these
findings were apparent even though participants correctly estimated the absence of shock during
the imagined extinction phases across both studies. In study 2, however, generalization was not
observed in brain activations within ROIs. Considering the elevations in self-reported fear and
SCR, this lack of brain activations was likely a representation of incomplete neural overlaps
between affective imagery and perception instead of absence of generalization. Indeed, the ROIs
applied to extinction fMRI data were generated based on the meta-analysis result by Fullana et
al. (2016) over perceptual fear conditioning. Our findings of self-reported fear and SCR were
consistent with results reported by Greening et al. (2021) in which generalization of fear from
viewing to imagining was also evident in brain regions including R-AIC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, and bilateral inferior parietal lobe. Here, the lack of significant contrasts in the brain
could be a result of methodological differences. Specifically, in study 2, the CS+ was imagined
after completion of perceptual conditioning while in Greening et al. (2021), imagery of CS+ was
produced during conditioning. Further research is needed to locate the regions involved in
generalized fear in imagery.
One concern was raised in study 1 regarding the possibility that the SCR elevations of
CS+ during imagery extinction was the result of imagining being more effortful as CS+ was
imagined while CS- was viewed. In study 2, both CS+ (i.e., CS+IV) and CS- was imagined
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confirming that the contrast in SCR was not due to the difference in effort between the actions of
active imagining and viewing.
5.3. Extinction of Fear Towards Viewed CS+ Following Imagery Exposure
Backed with successful conditioning and generalization, evaluations were made to
determine whether learned fear towards the perception of CS+ went through extinction after
repeated exposure to its imagery. Consistently across studies 1 and 2, no spontaneous recovery of
differential fear was observed based on SCR descriptions indicating that, as hypothesized,
extinction of fear took place via imagery exposure, consistent with the limited existing literature
(Agren et al., 2017; Reddan et al., 2018). This was further confirmed by the findings in study 2
that unlike the CS+ that went through imagery exposure (i.e., CS+IV), the CS+ that was not
imagined before re-exposure (i.e., CS+V) retained its differential SCR when it was viewed again
despite a correct reporting of no accompanying shock.
Interestingly, while no discrimination was detected in physiological responses (i.e., SCR)
when viewing the CS+ after imagery extinction, self-reported fear from participants in both
studies still carried an impression of conditioned fear. This resistance of self-reported fear
towards extinction was also observed by other researchers (Lau et al., 2008; Shechner et al.,
2015) and can be interpreted as a reflection of stable declarative knowledge of CS+ and CSidentities. In study 2, R-AIC and dACC ROIs also exhibited such resistance. Future research
examining the influence of declarative knowledge on expressions of conditioned fear is needed.
5.4. The Multi-Component Construct of Emotion
Outside of the main research question of imagery extinction, though still relevant, a
pattern emerged through the examination of results from studies 1 and 2, that depending on the
source of measurement, the derived description of fear varied. Specifically, the presence of
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conditioning or extinction effects in one measurement may not necessarily guarantee the same
pattern in another measure. So far, our investigations have employed subjective (i.e., selfreported fear), physiological (i.e., SCR), and neurological (i.e., fMRI) measures of fear and
found consistent support for conditioning in all of these indicators. The picture for extinction,
however, was less uniform with clear evidence only in the form of SCR expression. As
mentioned previously, considering the subjective nature of self-report data and that participants
were able to correctly detect CS-US contingencies, it is reasonable to attribute the persistence of
self-reported fear to a stable knowledge of CS identities. Nevertheless, these findings are
consistent with the literature where inconsistent levels of concordance have been reported across
(Friedman et al., 2014; Mauss et al., 2005; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994) and even within (Quigley
& Barrett, 2014) these three categories. The need of employment of multiple measurements
across subjective, physiological, and behavioral categories (Lang, 1968; Mauss & Robinson,
2009; Rachman, 1978) was made apparent. The missing piece in studies 1 and 2 was a
behavioral measure. In an effort to complete the “triangulation” of fear, study 3 sought to
determine the eligibility of a RT-based behavioral measure in the current conditioning paradigm.
One hurdle over choosing concurrent behavioral measures and perhaps part of the reason
why behavioral descriptions are relatively scarce is that the addition of behavioral probes may
cause interference to the conditioning process itself. While RT-based behavioral measures have
been used in human conditioning research (Lewis et al., 2013; Meulders et al., 2011; Öhman et
al., 2001; Silvers et al., 2016), none have looked into the possibility of interference. Based on
results of study 3, a conclusion can be made that within the selected conditioning paradigm, the
behavioral task generated a sensitive behavioral measure (i.e., RT) of differential fear learning
without causing deterrence to conditioning expressions in self-reported fear and SCR. As such,
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future fear conditioning research with similar experimental designs can extend data collection
from self-report and SCR to RT providing a more comprehensive assessment of fear.
Additionally, as the probe task performance during imagery trials relies on correct mental
visualization, this particular task can also serve as a window to imagery when needed.
5.5. Conclusion
In summary, results from the series of studies presented here provided support for
extinction of fear towards a perceptual stimulus via imagery exposure. We observed differential
fear after conditioning procedures supported by self-reported fear, SCR, and brain activations.
Following extinction through imagery, no recovery of conditioned fear was found as measured
by SCR upon re-exposure. Directions for future research was also provided with an emphasis on
multi-component assessments of emotional responses. In addition to fill in the gap within the
experimental literature of emotion regulation through imagery and provide guidance for the
clinical application of imagery-based treatments, future research with assorted outcome measures
could also contribute to the understanding of underlying mechanisms of emotion (Gentsch,
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014; Sze, Gyurak, Yuan, & Levenson, 2010) and inform clinical
diagnoses of affective conditions (Hastings et al., 2009; H. S. Schaefer et al., 2014).
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Appendix. Supplementary Material
A.1. Chapter 2

Figure 2.S1. Mean square-rooted SCR for each CS type during early and late Extinction Phase 1
(A) and Extinction Phase 2 (B). Error bars show ± 1 standard error. Each dot represents one
subject.
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A.2. Chapter 4

Figure 4.S1. Trial-by-trial SCR during acquisition in probe group and no probe group. First two
trials (CS+ trial 1 and CS- trial 1) displayed here are not included in analyses. Error bars show ±
1 standard error.
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